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Olsen: Mixed Signals in Trademark's "Likelihood of Confusion Law": Does

MIXED SIGNALS IN TRADEMARK’S
“LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION LAW”: DOES
QUALITY MATTER?
I. INTRODUCTION
“Bale University” is the highest ranked educational facility in the
eastern United States.1 Bale University has spent fortunes creating an
image of success and goodwill among its consumers. The qualifications
necessary to protect the name “Bale University” as a trademark have
been met. Furthermore, the general population recognizes the name
“Bale University” as source identification for the image and goodwill
created by Bale University. Until today, Bale University has never had
reason to bring a trademark infringement suit.
Bale University just found out that four different centers for higher
education were opening in different areas of the country under the
names Bail University West, Bail University Midwest, Bail University
North, and Bail University South. Believing that consumers would likely
mistake these universities as “Bale University,” Bale University
immediately brought a trademark infringement suit against each
university. Suits were brought in four separate federal district courts in
accordance with the alleged infringer’s location.
The first suit to commence was against Bail University South in the
South Circuit. The expected quality of Bail University South was
unknown at the time of the suit. Therefore, Bale University argued that
if the defendant was allowed to use Bail University South as the
university name, regardless of the quality of defendant’s goods, it would
lose control over the image and goodwill of the “Bale University”
trademark. The court explained that the South Circuit adopts a qualitycontrol theory and accepted Bale University’s argument regarding the
quality of defendant’s goods.
Then, before any other factor was considered in the South Circuit
suit, the second suit started against Bail University West in the West
Circuit. Bail University West was expected to open as the most
prestigious center for higher education on the West Coast. First, Bale
University argued, as it did in the South Circuit, that the only relevant
quality factor was its inability to maintain control over the “Bale
University” trademark. However, Bale University was immediately
informed by the court that the West Circuit will not adopt a qualitycontrol theory. Bale University then decided to argue that the similarity
1
The facts in this introductory hypothetical are fictional and were created by the
author.
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in quality between the levels of education offered at the universities
meant that the consumers were even more likely to be confused by the
use of Bail University West. The court explained that the West Circuit
adopted a tarnishment theory with respect to the quality of defendant’s
goods and, therefore, dismissed the similarity argument completely.
Next, the third suit commenced against Bail University Midwest in
the Midwest Circuit. Bail University Midwest was expected to rank just
slightly above the local community colleges in the Midwest. Bale
University thought it could use this to its advantage, so it argued the
tarnishment theory explaining that the vast difference in the levels of
education offered between the two universities would damage the image
and goodwill of the “Bale University” trademark. However, the court
dismissed this argument explaining that the Midwest Circuit adopted
the similarity theory recognizing the quality of defendant’s goods in
cases where the quality is similar enough to cause consumer confusion.
Finally, Bail University North faced suit in the North Circuit. Bail
University North was also going to open with a ranking just above the
local community colleges. Hoping to argue the tarnishment theory, Bale
University immediately searched for supporting case law in the North
Circuit. Finding support for the tarnishment theory in the North Circuit,
Bale University argued that the distinct difference in educational quality
would be destructive to the image of the “Bale University” trademark.
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument and instead
chose to adopt the defendant’s similarity theory argument that the
difference in quality was less likely to cause consumer confusion. The
court explained that the North Circuit has adopted both theories in
several cases and provides the judge with discretion in determining
which theory is applicable to a given case.
Unfortunately, this scenario is a possibility in the United States.
Every circuit in the United States has adopted its own test for
determining the likelihood of consumer confusion in trademark
infringement suits.2 Furthermore, each circuit has implemented its own
method for using the quality of defendant’s goods in determining the
likelihood of consumer confusion.3 The current status of applying the
quality of defendant’s goods to trademark infringement law is in
disarray.4 A sharp split exists among the different federal circuits and

See infra note 54 and accompanying text (outlining each circuit’s likelihood of
consumer confusion multifactor test).
3
See infra Part II.C (describing the circuit courts’ various methods for applying the
quality of defendant’s goods to trademark infringement cases).
4
See infra Part III (discussing the current discourse among judiciary in applying the
quality of defendant’s goods to trademark infringement cases).
2
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within individual circuits regarding the application of quality of
defendant’s goods to trademark infringement suits.5 Courts handling
trademark infringement suits must decide whether the quality factor
should apply to different stages of consumer confusion, what elements
the court should consider as the “quality” of defendant’s goods, who is
the reasonably prudent consumer analyzing the quality of defendant’s
goods, and what quality theory should be applied.6
Uniform application of the consumer confusion factors, specifically
the quality of defendant’s goods, is vital to protect those trademarks
used throughout the Unites States. In understanding the difficulty of the
problem, this Note first examines the relevant trademark law applicable
to the federal courts’ current state of disarray.7 Then this Note analyzes
the adequacy and deficiencies related to each of the three theories
(tarnishment, similarity, quality control) used to analyze the impact of
the quality of defendant’s goods on the question of consumer confusion.8
Finally, this Note proposes three necessary alterations to the current
common law methods for applying the quality of defendant’s goods in
trademark infringement cases.9
II. BACKGROUND
There is disarray among circuit courts in determining which of the
three methods to apply when analyzing how quality should be
considered under the “likelihood of consumer confusion test” in a
trademark infringement case.10
It is important to have a basic
understanding of relevant trademark law before examining the proposed
alternative to the circuit courts’ arbitrary adoption of the tarnishment,
See infra Part II.C (recognizing the disagreement among courts in different circuits and
within the same circuit regarding the proper application of the quality of defendant’s
goods to a trademark infringement case).
6
See infra Part II (noting the legal background of trademark law); infra Part III
(analyzing the legal barriers court’s face in determining whether the quality factor should
apply to different types of confusion, what elements should be considered as the “quality”
of defendant’s goods, who is the reasonably prudent consumer likely to be confused, and
what quality theory should be applied).
7
See infra Part II (outlining relevant trademark law including the elements necessary to
obtain and maintain trademark protection, the elements necessary to prove trademark
infringement, the adoption of the quality factor, and the different methods used by courts
when applying the quality factor).
8
See infra Part III (analyzing the impact the status quo will have on future trademark
infringement cases and the advantages and disadvantages of each quality theory).
9
See infra Part IV (proposing three easy adaptations to the current method for applying
the quality of defendant’s goods to a trademark infringement suit).
10
See infra Part II.C (discussing the confusion created by various inter-circuit and intracircuit splits).
5
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similarity, and quality-control methods used to analyze the existence of
consumer confusion.11 Part II explores the basic legal trademark
concepts necessary to understand the proposed alternative to the
application of quality under the likelihood of consumer confusion test in
a trademark infringement case.12 Part II.A begins this journey by briefly
recognizing the legal history of trademark protection.13 Next, Part II.B
walks through the steps necessary to prove the existence of a trademark
infringement and introduces the quality factor used as one element of
the likelihood of consumer confusion test.14 Finally, Part II.C explores
various theories adopted by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
in resolving trademark infringement cases and the problems created by
these theories.15
A. Trademark Protection
In the United States, the individual states were the first to develop
trademark protection rights and continue to do so today.16 The First
See infra Part II (outlining the basic elements of trademark law).
See infra Part II (analyzing the basic legal trademark concepts necessary to understand
the proposed alternative to the current application of quality under the likelihood of
consumer confusion test discussed in Part IV).
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the development of trademark protection).
14
See infra Part II.B (discussing the elements of a trademark infringement case,
specifically the likelihood of confusion subpart, and particularly the quality factor within
the likelihood of confusion subpart).
15
See infra Part II.C (analyzing the general problem created by various inter-circuit and
intra-circuit splits).
16
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 167 (6th ed. 2008) (“The fundamental legal principles that
govern trademarks and prohibit passing off evolved at common law, primarily as a matter
of state law.”). See ALA. CODE §§ 8-12-6 to -19 (LexisNexis 2002); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 45.50.010–.205 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1441 to -1456 (2003 & Supp. 2008);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-71-201 to -218 (2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 14200–342 (West
2008 & Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-70-102 to -114 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11a–m, 35-18a–j (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 3301–
15 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 495.011–.191 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 101-440 to -454 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482-1 to -37 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to 518 (2003 & Supp. 2009); ILL COMP. STAT. tit. 765 §§ 1036/1 to /90 (2008); IND. CODE §§ 24-21-2 to -15.3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 548.101–.117 (West 1997 & Supp.
2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-201 to -220 (1997 & Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 365.561–.625 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:211–:224 (2003 & Supp. 2007); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1521–32 (1997 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §§ 1-401
to -415 (LexisNexis 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110H, §§ 1–17 (1999 & Supp. 2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 333.18–.45 (2004 & Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-25-1 to -33
(2000); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.005–.066 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3013-301 to -336 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-127 to -144 (LexisNexis 2008); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 600.240–.450 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350A:1–:15 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:3-13.1a–.22 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009); N.M.
11
12
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Restatement of Torts explains the early common law theories of
trademark protection.17 However, the federal government’s adoption of
the Lanham Act in 1946, while not superseding the state regulations, was
a pivotal step in trademark protection history.18 The Lanham Act, as
amended, allows a user to register the mark with the Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) at a small fee for federal trademark
protection.19 An individual or entity receiving federal trademark
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3B-1 to -17 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 360 to 360-r
(McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 80-1 to -14 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 47-22-01 to -13 (1999 & Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1329.54–.671 (West 2004);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 21–33 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 647.005–.155 (West
2007)); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101–1126 (West 1996 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 62-1 to -16 (2001 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-1105 to -1195 (1985 & Supp. 2008);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-6-1 to -32 (2004 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-501 to 518 (2001 & Supp. 2008); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.01–.31 (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70-3a-103 to -502 (2001 & Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 2521–2532 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-92.1 to 92.15 (2006 & Supp. 2009); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.77.010–.940 (West & Supp. 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-1 to -19
(LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.001–.25 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-101
to -116 (2009); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 171–215 (West, Westlaw through December 2005).
17
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 731 (1938). Section 731 states:
In determining whether one’s interest in a trade-mark or trade
name is protected, under the rules stated in §§ 717 and 730, with
reference to the goods, services or business in connection with which
the actor uses his designation, the following factors are important:
(a) the likelihood that the actor’s goods, services or business will
be mistaken for those of the other; (b) the likelihood that the other may
expand his business so as to compete with the actor; (c) the extent to
which the goods or services of the actor and those of the other have
common purchasers or users; (d) the extent to which the goods or
services of the actor and those of the other are marketed through the
same channels; (e) the relation between the functions of the goods or
services of the actor and those of the other; (f) the degree of
distinctiveness of the trademark or trade name; (g) the degree of
attention usually given to trade symbols in the purchase of goods or
services of the actor and those of the other; (h) the length of time
during which the actor has used the designation; (i) the intent of the
actor in adopting and using the designation.
Id.
18
Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1072). See Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has
Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 803 (2005) (acknowledging the Lanham Act for its role in
emphasizing the importance of protecting the goodwill created by trademarks).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006) (requiring an applicant to include in the application
specifications of the following: applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date the mark was
first used in commerce, the goods in connection to the mark, and a drawing of the mark).
See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari Brief at 4, Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith
Guitars, L.P., 547 U.S. 1179 (2006) (No. 05-1263), 2006 WL 858515 [hereinafter Gibson Guitar
Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (noting that a user’s mark shall be incontestable after five
years of consecutive use subsequent to filing).
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registration has an easier time proving the existence of a qualified
trademark, but registration is not necessary to enjoy the Lanham Act’s
protection.20 Protection under the Act requires registration or actual use
of a qualified mark in commerce.21 Although the elements necessary to
gain and maintain trademark protection are important aspects of
trademark law, this Note focuses on the elements used by the judiciary
in trademark infringement suits; specifically, the quality of an alleged
infringer’s goods.22
B. Trademark Infringement
Lanham Act sections 32, for registered marks, and 43(a), for
unregistered marks, outline the elements of trademark infringement
including, but not limited to, use in commerce, a registrable mark, and
likelihood of consumer confusion.23 A trademark infringement case
20
Anne Hiaring, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in PRACTICING LAW INST.,
UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW: 2007, at 27, 30 (2007). “In the United States, the
establishment of ownership rights in trademarks and service marks requires either the: 1)
filing of intent to use applications to register with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, or 2) actual use of the mark in commerce.” Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (also known as
Lanham Act § 43(a)) (outlining the steps necessary for proving a trademark infringement
when the trademark has not yet been registered with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office). Section 43(a) states in part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
21
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (outlining the methods to establish
ownership rights in a trademark and receive Lanham Act protection for the trademark).
22
See infra Part II.B (analyzing the legal analysis examined in the administration of
trademark infringement suits).
23
Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). Section 32 states in part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
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focuses on the consequences of the defendant’s actions and not on the
defendant’s intent to infringe upon another’s trademark.24
The
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall
not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been
committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125, Section 43(a) states in part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person . . . .
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995). Section 20 states:
(1) One is subject to liability for infringement of another’s
trademark, trade name, collective mark, or certification mark if the
other’s use has priority under the rules stated in § 19 and in identifying
the actor’s business or in marketing the actor’s goods or services the
actor uses a designation that causes a likelihood of confusion:
(a) that the actor’s business is the business of the other
or is associated or otherwise connected with the other; or
(b) that the goods or services marketed by the actor are
produced, sponsored, certified, or approved by the other; or
(c) that the goods or services marketed by the other are
produced, sponsored, certified, or approved by the actor.
(2) One is also subject to liability for infringement of another’s
collective membership mark if the other’s use has priority under the
rules stated in § 19 and the actor uses a designation that causes a
likelihood of confusion that the actor is a member of or otherwise
associated with the collective group.
Id.
24
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20, cmt. c. The authors recognized
that early infringement cases were brought under deceit, then fraud was presumed, and
finally the element was illuminated. Id. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji
Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the trial court erred when it
considered the defendant’s “overwhelming” good faith as a defense); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
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trademark infringement elements serve the following two purposes: (1)
to protect the mark owner’s goodwill and reputation, and (2) to protect
the prospective purchaser’s interest in relying on marks as support for
his or her purchasing decisions.25 Therefore, the use of a mark for the
sole purpose of describing the actor’s goods, referring to the mark owner,
or referring to the mark owner’s goods does not produce confusion and
does not constitute an infringement.26 Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2 discuss the
likelihood of consumer confusion test and the application of quality as a
factor in the test.27

Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that defendant’s good faith belief
that confusion would not occur was not a defense in an infringement case). But see, e.g.,
Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing
that intent to cipher benefits from the plaintiff’s mark may be per se evidence of confusing
similarity); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Prods. Corp., 287 F. 243, 246–47
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (noting that a plaintiff does not need to prove product inferiority when
evidence exists that proves defendant’s intent to benefit from plaintiff’s reputation or
advertising).
25
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20, cmt. b.
26
Id. This section does not apply when the mark is used for any purpose other than as a
mark. Id. A typical non-infringement case is comparative advertising where a registered
mark is used for the sole purpose of ensuring that the purchasing public recognizes the
mark as the source of its true owner. Id. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that using the phrase “New Kids” as a
reference without suggesting sponsorship or endorsement is not considered a trademark
infringement).
Much useful social and commercial discourse would be all but
impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit
every time they made reference to a person, company or product by
using its trademark.
....
. . . Similarly, competitors may use a rival’s trademark in
advertising and other channels of communication if the use is not false
or misleading.
....
. . . [W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the
plaintiff’s product, rather than its own, we hold that a commercial user
is entitled to a nominative fair use defense provided he meets the
following three requirements: First, the product or service in question
must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark;
second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the
user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
Id. at 307–08 (internal footnote omitted); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715
F.2d 837, 843 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that a mark is not taboo and can therefore be used
truthfully to reference the mark owner).
27
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (outlining the likelihood of confusion test and the quality
factor’s application to this test).
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Likelihood of Consumer Confusion

Each circuit court has adopted its own multifactor test—sometimes
referred to as the “digits of confusion”—for determining whether
consumers will likely be confused between various marks.28 The circuit
9 BRENT A. OLSON & LISA C. THOMPSON, ARIZONA PRACTICE SERIES TM § 16:27 (2007).
“A determination of likelihood of confusion is made by balancing those factors that are
relevant in a particular case, keeping in mind that the factors are not listed in an order of
merit and that each may, from case to case, play either a major or minor role.” Id. (citing In
re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 729 (1938) (setting forth the original analysis for determining whether
two marks are confusingly similar). Section 729 states:
In determining whether the actor’s designation is confusingly
similar to the other’s trade-mark or trade name, the following factors
are important:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trademark or trade name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the
goods or services marketed by the actor and those marketed by
the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
Id.; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1589 (2006). Beebe recognizes that the circuits have the following four
common factors within each of their multifactor tests: the similarity of the marks, the
proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, and strength of the particular mark.
Id. See also Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining the
First Circuit’s multifactor test, which is: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of
the goods; (3) the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade; (4) the relationship
between the parties’ advertising; (5) the classes of prospective purchasers; (6) evidence of
actual confusion; (7) the defendant’s intent in adopting its mark; and (8) the strength of the
plaintiff’s mark); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(noting the Second Circuit’s multifactor test, which is: (1) the strength of his make; (2) the
degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) bridging
the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its
own mark; (7) the quality of defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers);
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (outlining the Third Circuit’s
multifactor test, which is: (1) similarity of marks; (2) the strength of the owner’s mark; (3)
the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of
consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the
mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) defendant’s intent; (6) actual
confusion; (7) marketing and advertising channels; (8) similarity of sales efforts; (9)
relationship of the goods because of the similarity of function; (10) other relevant factors);
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241–42 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing
the Fourth Circuit’s multifactor test, which is: (1) the strength or distinctiveness of the
mark; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the similarity of the goods or services which the
marks identify; (4) the similarity of business facilities; (5) the similarity of advertising; (6)
28
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the defendant’s intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) the proximity of the products as they are
actually sold; (9) bridging the gap; (10) the quality of the defendant’s product; and (11) the
sophistication of the buyers); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975)
(discussing the Fifth Circuit’s multifactor test, which is: (1) the type of trademark at issue;
(2) similarity of design; (3) similarity of product; (4) identity of retail outlets and
purchasers; (5) identity of advertising media utilized; (6) defendant’s intent; and (7) actual
confusion); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Stuebenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th
Cir. 1982) (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s multifactor test, which is: (1) strength of the
plaintiff’s mark; (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7)
defendant’s intent; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines); Conagra, Inc. v.
Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984) (outlining the Eleventh Circuit’s multifactor
test, which is: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the similarity between the marks; (3) the
similarity between the products and services offered; (4) the similarity of the sales methods
(including retail outlets and customers); (5) the similarity of advertising methods; (6) the
defendant’s intent; and (7) actual confusion); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church &
Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss
Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 705 (2d Cir. 1970)) (referencing the Seventh Circuit’s multifactor test,
which is: (1) the degree of similarity between the marks; (2) the similarity of the products;
(3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by
consumers; (5) the strength of the complainant’s mark; (6) actual confusion; and (7) alleged
infringer’s intent); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980)
(acknowledging the Eighth Circuit’s multifactor test, which is:
(1) strength and
distinctiveness of mark; (2) similarity of marks (visual and aural); (3) relatedness of
products; (4) competitive proximity; (5) alleged infringer’s intent; (6) actual confusion; (7)
degree of purchaser care); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979)
(emphasizing the Ninth Circuit multifactor test, which is: (1) strength of the mark; (2)
proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines); Beer
Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing the Tenth
Circuit’s multifactor test, which is: (1) the degree of similarity between the marks
(including appearance, pronunciation of the words used, verbal translation of the pictures
or designs involved, and suggestion); (2) the actor’s intent; (3) similarity in use and
manner of marketing; and (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers); In re
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361 (referencing the Federal Circuit’s multifactor
test, which is: (1) similarity of the marks (including appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression); (2) similarity of the goods or services; (3) the similarity
established, likely-to-continue trade channels; (4) the conditions of the sale (including
impulse or sophisticated purchasing); (5) the fame of the prior mark (including sales,
advertising, and length of use); (6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods; (7) actual confusion; (8) the length of time during and conditions under
which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) the variety
of goods on which a mark is or is not used (including house mark, family mark, or product
mark); (10) the market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark; (11) the
extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods;
(12) the extent of potential confusion (including de minimis or substantial); and (13) any
other established fact probative of the effect of use); Globalaw Ltd. v. Carmon & Carmon
Law Office, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting the D.C. Circuit’s multifactor test,
which is: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) actual confusion; (5) the defendant’s purpose
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courts each use different standards for determining the likelihood of
consumer confusion resulting from the use of a mark, but they all require
that the mark owner must show a probability that the mark will likely
cause confusion among the purchasing public in order to prove
trademark infringement.29 While proof of actual confusion is not
or intent; (6) the quality of defendant’s product; and (7) the sophistication of the buyers).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1995). Section 21 states:
Whether an actor’s use of a designation causes a likelihood of
confusion with the use of a trademark, trade name, collective mark, or
certification mark by another under the rule stated in § 20 is
determined by a consideration of all the circumstances involved in the
marketing of the respective goods or services or in the operation of the
respective businesses. In making that determination the following
market factors, among others, may be important:
(a) the degree of similarity between the respective designations,
including a comparison of
(i) the overall impression created by the designations as they
are used in marketing the respective goods or services or in
identifying the respective businesses;
(ii) the pronunciation of the designations;
(iii) the translation of any foreign words contained in the
designations;
(iv) the verbal translation of any pictures, illustrations, or
designs contained in the designations;
(v) the suggestions, connotations, or meanings of the
designations;
(b) the degree of similarity in the marketing methods and
channels of distribution used for the respective goods or services;
(c) the characteristics of the prospective purchasers of the goods
or services and the degree of care they are likely to exercise in making
purchasing decisions;
(d) the degree of distinctiveness of the other’s designation;
(e) when the goods, services, or business of the actor differ in kind
from those of the other, the likelihood that the actor's prospective
purchasers would expect a person in the position of the other to
expand its marketing or sponsorship into the product, service, or
business market of the actor; (f) when the actor and the other sell
their goods or services or carry on their businesses in different
geographic markets, the extent to which the other’s designation is
identified with the other in the geographic market of the actor.
Id.
29
74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 86 (2008). Possibility of confusion is not
enough to prove trademark infringement; probability of confusion is the standard and may
be met when a large number of purchasers are confused as to source. Id. See OLSON &
THOMPSON, supra note 28, § 16:27 (citing Fisher Stores, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc.,
626 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1980)). Some courts require a substantial likelihood that the
public will be confused by the defendants mark. Id.; 1 CHARLES MCKENNEY & GEORGE F.
LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT 43A § 3:8 (1989), UNFAIRCOMP
§ 3:8 (Westlaw database updated Apr. 2009). “Some courts treat the standard of likelihood
of confusion under Section 43(a) as a question of fact which can only be set aside if clearly
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necessary in order to prove trademark infringement, proof that
consumers are not confused by the use of the mark eliminates the need
to perform the multifactor test.30
Confusion from a mark’s use can occur at three different stages:
initial-interest confusion, point-of-sale confusion, and post-sale
confusion.31 Initial-interest confusion, while handled differently by
different circuit courts, refers to a company improperly using another’s
mark to gain customer attention.32 Point-of-sale confusion, the most
common form used in prosecuting infringement cases, causes the
purchasing public to believe the product or service they are purchasing
is from a source other than its true creator.33 Post-sale confusion can
erroneous, whereas others treat it as a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact.”
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
30
NAT’L BUS. INST., TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LITIGATION UPDATE 22 (2008) (quoting
Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Like other courts, this circuit has articulated a multi-factor approach to
assessing the probability of confusion. These factors include whether
the trademarks use the same word, whether they sound alike, and so
on. . . . A list of factors designed as proxies for the likelihood of
confusion can’t supersede the statutory inquiry. If we know for sure that
consumers are not confused about a product’s origin, there is no need to
consult even a single proxy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
31
See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (describing initial-interest confusion,
point-of-sale confusion, and post-sale confusion resulting from the use of a mark); see also
MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 29, § 3:8 (explaining how the potential for confusion can
be source-generated deception or can be recognition-deception as to sponsorship, approval,
authorization or association).
32
E.g. Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 431 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Initial interest confusion occurs
when potential customers initially are attracted to the junior user’s mark by virtue of its
similarity to the senior user’s mark, even though these consumers are not actually confused
at the time of purchase.” (quoting Empresa Cubana del Tabaca v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ.
8399, 2004 WL 602295, at *49 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004) (internal quotations omitted)));
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005);
PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) overruled on other
grounds by KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004);
Deere & Co. v. MTD Holdings Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5936(LMM), 2004 WL 324890, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004). See also MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 29, § 3:8 (suggesting
that the elements constituting the standard for likelihood of confusion should be used
when analyzing initial-confusion); Gibson Guitar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
19, at 11 (explaining that the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits apply
the initial interest confusion doctrine broadly). See generally 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER,
INFORMATION LAW § 6:52 (Westlaw database updated June 2009), INFOLAW 6:52
(examining whether initial-interest confusion should be a type of confusion itself or simply
one of many factors used when analyzing whether confusion exists and suggesting that
initial-interest confusion is focused on siphoning consumers away from their intended
purchasing destination).
33
See Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245–46 (6th Cir. 1991). In Esercizio, the
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have an effect on the resale market by confusing third parties, parties
who see the mark, but are not the original purchaser, as to the source of
the product or service.34 The judiciary will look to the reasonably
prudent consumer to determine whether each stage of confusion has
occurred.35 The reasonably prudent consumer will examine quality as
defendant successfully argued against point of sale confusion by admitting to his patrons
that “his significantly cheaper cars and kits were not genuine Ferraris and thus there was
no confusion at point of sale.” Id. By proving that the consumers were not confused, but
were truly aware of the differences in the two marks and knew that any goodwill
associated with the other mark was irrelevant to the purchase of this item acted as
justification for the court’s decision to eliminate any point of sale confusion claims. Id.
34
Gibson Guitar, 423 F.3d at 549 (citing Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir.
1991)) (recognizing that post sale confusion can damage the reputation of a company and
therefore effect the resale market of a company’s goods). See 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA
POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 22:11 (4th
ed. 2008). Failing to take post-sale confusion into account can be grounds for reversal in a
trademark infringement case. Id. (citing Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative
House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)). Similar to initial-interest confusion,
post-sale confusion can cause someone viewing a product from a distance to buy the
similar, allegedly infringing, product believing it to be the same product. Id. (quoting Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 799
F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986)). Additionally, post-sale confusion, due to a plethora of knock-offs,
can cause fear within the purchasing public. Id. (citing Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris
Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000)). Consumers owning originals are harmed
because the benefit of scarcity has been removed and because it may require an expert to
differentiate between a knock-off and an original. Id. However, consumers owning a
cheap imitation or knock-off version may acquire the prestige value of an original in the
minds of the purchasing public. Id. (quoting Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron
& Constantin-LeCoultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955)). Malletier v.
Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 431 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006) (imposing liability not based on purchaser confusion, but
on potential future purchaser confusion because a potential purchaser who begins seeing
increasing numbers of a limited product is less likely to purchase the rare product);
Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245–46 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).
35
Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer
Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 575–76 (2008). The mindset of
the ordinary consumer is judged “under the normally prevalent conditions of the market”
and is expected to give the same quality attention to the purchase as a purchaser would
usually give when buying the specific product. Id. at 575. (citing W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v.
Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1993)). Courts have recognized a range of views
when analyzing the mindset or intelligence of a reasonable prudent consumer including:
“ignorant . . . unthinking and . . . credulous” and “hasty, heedless and easily deceived.” Id.
(citing Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910); Stix Prods., Inc. v.
United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); Stork Rest., Inc. v.
Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948) (“It may well be true that a prudent and worldlywise passerby would not be so deceived. The law, however, protects not only the
intelligent, the experienced, and the astute. It safeguards from deception also the ignorant,
the inexperienced, and the gullable.”). Moreover, commentators are split between
apologists, who believe consumers are fools highly susceptible to the slightest suggestion,
and restrictionists, who believe consumers are informed sovereigns unlikely to become
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one of the elements when determining the existence of each stage of
confusion.36
2.

Quality as a Standard

Courts have been adopting quality as a relevant factor in resolving
trademark infringement cases since the early 1940s.37 Quality of the
infringer’s goods has played an important role in the development of
United States trademark infringement law.38 Additionally, although
some commentators suggest that quality is a “rogue factor,” research
reveals that on average, one-third of trademark infringement cases
consider quality when determining whether a trademark has been
infringed.39
confused. W.W.W. Pharm. Co., 984 F.2d at 576; Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in
Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2041–42 (2005) (describing a consumer
sophistication curve where restrictionists and apologists fall on opposite ends). See also
MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 29, § 3:8 (“Confusion resulting from the consuming
public’s carelessness, indifference, or ennui will not suffice. The legislature contemplated
the reaction of the ordinary person who is neither savant nor dolt, and who exercises a
normal measure of the layman’s common sense and judgment.”) (quoting A1 Mortgage
Corp. v. A1 Mortgage & Fin. Servs., L.L.C., No. 2:03-CV-2002, 2006 WL 1437744, at *8 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 16, 2006))). See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly) Rational Bass of Trademark
Liability, 15 TEX. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 331, 333–34 (2007) (explaining the cognitive psychology of
trademarks and consumer decision making).
36
See infra Part II.B.2 (examining how quality has been used as a standard for
determining the existence of consumer confusion and therefore the existence of a
trademark infringement).
37
Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law,
85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 994 (2001). Judges initially created the issue of quality function
protection by finding confusion in cases that included shoddy imitations which were likely
to cause the senior user reputational damage. Id. However, “the outcome of infringement
cases during the 1940s and 1950s often depended entirely on which panel was sitting.” Id.
at 1003.
38
Id. at 959 n.53. Judge Learned Hand refined infringement analysis by viewing the
quality element on a continuum encompassing both potential source confusion and
reputational injury. Id. at 997. However, Magliocca suggests that the quality of a junior
user’s goods is no longer relevant to an infringement analysis. Id. at 1002. See, e.g., Lee,
Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 579 n.22 (suggesting that quality is a rogue factor
not adopted by all of the circuit courts).
39
Beebe, supra note 28, at 1581. Beebe created an empirical study comprising of the 331
federal district court opinions which included a multifactor test for the likelihood of
confusion spanning the five year period from 2000–2004. Id. at 1581. This study showed
that the D.C. and Second Circuit alone had eighty-eight cases that addressed quality as a
factor in the infringement analysis. Id. at 1644. This analysis shows that twenty-seven
percent of the cases included the factor and does not even consider the Fourth Circuit,
which also regularly considers quality as a relevant factor. See supra note 38 (referencing
commentators who believe quality is a rogue factor whose application to trademark
infringement suits is limited); supra note 28 and accompanying text (outlining the various
factors used by each circuit court when analyzing the likelihood of consumer confusion).
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A court must determine what should be considered under the
quality factor before analyzing the circuit’s particular use of the quality
factor in trademark infringement cases.40 The Second Circuit suggested
that the quality factor should be considered only against the mark’s
representing product, service, or business and not against the company
as a whole.41 However, some courts and commentators have recognized
environmental concerns, advertisements and publicity, the portrayed
view or message, and even the mental images created in the consumers
mind as relevant quality considerations.42 Nonetheless, to prove
trademark infringement, a company must show actual injury from the
quality and not just a desire or wish to disassociate itself from the
infringing mark.43 These quality considerations can play an essential
role within the likelihood of consumer confusion test and can thus

See infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (discussing what elements should be
considered under the quality factor in a trademark infringement case).
41
W. Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1990). The court
suggested that quality must be determined by analyzing the specific product at issue and
not considering any accompanying products. Id. Therefore, evidence of a secondary
paper’s inferiority was considered irrelevant to the quality factor in this particular
trademark infringement case. Id.
42
See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2137
n.113 (2004). Bone suggests that quality should be analyzed from a broad sense including
the company’s environmental policies and television commercials. Id. By including these
additional elements, Bone suggests that this will better encapsulate the consumers’ idea of
quality. Id. However, Bone cautions that adding quality as a factor in this manner will
promote litigation and increase administrative and error costs. Id. at 2152 n.150. Leon also
recognizes that advertising will represent the quality of the product when the product is
commercial advertising. Michael A. Leon, Note, Unauthorized Pop-Up Advertising and the
Copyright and Unfair Competition Implications, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 978 (2004). Malik
further suggests that publicized view or messages related to a particular product or service
are pertinent elements to the quality analysis because they may place the senior user’s
product in an “unwholesome or unsavory context.” Attiya Malik, Are You Content with the
Content? Intellectual Property Implications of Weblog Publishing, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 439, 470 (2003). In support of the above commentators, the Southern District of
New York recognized a consumer’s mental images when analyzing the quality factor.
MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
The court determined that mental images were relevant to the case at hand because “MGM
uses its mark to promote an image of lighthearted, nonpolitical, asexual, amicable, comic
entertainment” while Patrol’s use of the name represents “political activism, violence,
defiance, homosexuality, and angry confrontation.” Id. But see Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks,
524 F. Supp. 2d 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The court considered proof of lesser experience in
the industry to be insufficient to establish a claim of product inferiority under the quality
factor. Id.
43
See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 965 (2d Cir. 1996). The
court recognized that the company’s wish to disassociate itself from bar establishments was
insufficient evidentiary proof of injury. Id.
40
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determine the existence of a trademark infringement.44 However, the
elements considered under the quality factor must be in accordance with
the circuit courts’ different methods for applying the quality factor.45
C. The Circuit Courts’ Different Methods for Applying the Quality Factor
The circuit courts create a general problem by adopting different
methods for applying the quality factor before analyzing the various
methods for which the quality factor can be used.46 Part II.C.1 begins by
discussing the general problem and its relevant effect on our current
legal system.47 Next, Part II.C.2 introduces the various inter-circuit and
intra-circuit splits.48 Finally, Part II.C.3 analyzes Gibson Guitar Corp. v.
Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, an important Sixth Circuit holding, and its
effect on trademark infringement cases in the Tenth Circuit.49
1.

The General Problem with Adopting Three Mutually Exclusive
Applications of the Quality Factor

Problems will inevitably arise when a sharp circuit court split occurs
and the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to provide guidance in
any of the thirty-five trademark infringement cases it has heard in the
past 175 years.50 Circuit courts are sharply divided and confused with
See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that a limited view of what is to be
considered as the quality of the defendants goods can alter the outcome of a trademark
infringement case).
45
See infra Part II.C (explaining the different methods for applying the quality factor in
trademark infringement cases and recognizing the general problems these methods can
create in resolving such cases).
46
See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining the general problem in resolving trademark
infringement cases created by a sharp divide among circuit courts application of the quality
factor).
47
See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining the general problem created by the judiciary applying
a single factor in the likelihood of consumer confusion test, the quality factor, in three
different variations when resolving trademark infringement cases).
48
See infra Part II.C.2 (identifying various inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits regarding
the application of quality as a factor under the likelihood of confusion test in resolving
trademark infringement cases).
49
See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the importance of Gibson and its effect on the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis of trademark infringement cases).
50
See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (explaining the general problems created
by the sharply divided circuits). See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004); Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418 (2003); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Feltner
v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994);
Brooke Group LTD v. Brown & Williams Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Two Pesos,
44
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regard to the proper application of the quality factor to the likelihood of
consumer confusion test in trademark infringement cases.51 This lack of
uniformity gives judges the discretion to use the method most favorable
to their outcome of choice.52 Furthermore, the inter-circuit split will
likely promote forum shopping according to whichever circuit will best
fit the plaintiff’s facts in a particular case.53 Some circuits focus on using
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Chauffeurs, Tempsters & Helpers, Local No.
391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); S.F. Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm. 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982); Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S.
623 (1977); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Life Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Switz. Cheese Ass’n
v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962);
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331
U.S. 125 (1947); Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. Nat’l Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942);
Reconstruction Fin. Co. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938);
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251
(1916). In each of these cases, the Supreme Court failed to unify the application of
trademark law.
51
See infra Parts II.C.2–3 (outlining various methods used by circuit courts in applying
the quality factor to the likelihood of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement
cases); see also Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 460 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that
the quality factor is a subject of disarray among courts in resolving trademark infringement
cases).
52
Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 578–79. As previously discussed, courts
have varying interpretations of the “ordinary” or “reasonably prudent” consumer. See
supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (describing the ordinary and prudent consumer).
Furthermore, courts have interpreted the existence of secondary meaning, an element
necessary for descriptive marks to receive protection, differently. See generally Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition in the Courts of General Jurisdiction,
98 TRADEMARK REP. 52 (2008) (outlining each circuit’s test for finding secondary meaning).
Additionally, courts have used the quality factor differently in determining a likelihood of
consumer confusion. See generally infra Parts II.C.2–3 (outlining various methods used by
circuit courts in applying the quality factor to the likelihood of confusion test in trademark
infringement cases). “To some degree, the cases leave room for the impression that courts
may simply be adjusting their finding of whether the relevant consumer population is
sophisticated or unsophisticated to conform to the result they wish to achieve.” Lee,
Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 578–79 (internal quotations omitted).
53
Plaintiffs may choose the district because of how the circuit uses the quality factor
either to support plaintiffs or as a lack of support for defendants. A plaintiff who does not
recognize the infringing good, as either equal or inferior to their own, will likely choose the
Seventh, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits, which focus on the quality-control theory. See also
Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. v. Barrow, 143 F. App’x 180, 191 (11th Cir. 2005) (“It is the loss of
control [over the nature and quality] of one's reputation by the adoption of a confusingly
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quality in authorized use cases while others hardly consider the quality
factor at all.54 Finally, attorneys are unable to properly present cases in
the circuit courts that lack internal uniformity in applying the quality
factor to the likelihood of consumer confusion test.55
2.

Inter-Circuit & Intra-Circuit Splits

The Second Circuit is most widely known for its adoption of the
Polaroid factors, which use the quality of defendant’s goods as a factor for

similar mark that supplies the substantial threat of irreparable harm.”); Playmakers L.L.C.
v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Tarnishment may be a theory of liability or
a type of harm, but it is not itself a factor to be considered in determining whether
consumer confusion is likely.”); Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1180–81
(11th Cir. 1994) (finding no evidence of inferiority, but recognizing that inferiority is not a
prerequisite for trademark infringement); Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v. Bausch
& Lomb Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that a lack of control of the
company’s reputation can show irreparable harm without any proof of lost sales, lost
market share, or inferior goods); Juvenile Shoe Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 57, 59 (9th Cir. 1923)
(recognizing that the word “juvenile” as applied to shoes is exclusively granted to the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff should have complete control over the trademark because of
the goodwill and reputation established through the production of high quality shoes);
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Ala. Farmers Fed’n, 935 F. Supp. 1533, 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(“[A] trademark’s value as an indicator of sponsorship correlates to the public’s trust in the
sponsor’s personal guarantee of quality. . . . The rule assures that ‘[t]he quality [and value]
of a [registrant’s mark] lie within his own control.’ . . . Even if a defendant’s product rivals
or exceeds the quality of a registrant’s product, the unauthorized product is still trademark
infringement because it deprives the registrant of its ability to shape the contours of its
reputation.”); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp.
472, 474 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Trademark infringement will lie even when a defendant’s
product is superior to the product of the trademark owner, simply because of the potential
for damage to reputation where the trademark owner has no control over the quality of the
defendant’s product or service.”).
54
See Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1237, 1243, 1251–52
(D.N.J. 1994). The court recognized that the Third Circuit will find trademark infringement
if the goods are replicas of inferior quality or have been tainted. Id. Furthermore, the court
determined that in this case, defendants’ attempt to remove identification salon codes from
the products caused esthetic damage but was unlikely to lead consumers to believe that the
plaintiff, Matrix, sold shoddy goods. Id.; Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1350 (8th
Cir. 1987) (recognizing that an unauthorized sale of goods, which are replicas of inferior
quality or have been tainted by mishandling, would be considered a material difference
and would constitute a trademark infringement). See also Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A.
v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding the district court in error
because proof of product quality inferiority is not a necessary element to a Lanham
Trademark Act violation); Food Fair Stores Inc. v. Food Fair Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.
Mass. 1948) (recognizing that under Massachusetts law a premier quality good is not an
affirmative defense in a infringement case). In Societe Des Produits Nestle, the mere showing
that Venezuelan-made chocolates were not inferior to Italian-made chocolates did not
prevent the court from finding a trademark violation. 982 F.2d at 640.
55
See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits).
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determining whether a mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.56
One interpretation of the Second Circuit’s adoption of the quality factor
focuses on the tarnishment theory: goods of inferior or shoddy quality
are likely to cause great reputational damage and should therefore be
considered as additional proof of confusion.57 However, over the years
the Second Circuit has questioned this theory and has instead adopted
the similarity theory as an alternative: goods of similar quality are likely
to cause confusion because the consumer is more likely to believe that
goods of similar quality originate from the same source.58 Nonetheless,
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
See, e.g., Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 965 (2d Cir. 1996)
(analyzing the quality factor from the tarnishment theory but requiring that proof of injury
be evident when claiming an injury from association); Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley
Works, 59 F.3d 384, 398 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting the quality of defendant’s product
factor as primarily focusing on inferior quality and the harm such quality can cause to the
original trademark owners reputation and specifically determining that a similar quality
analysis is not relevant where the products differ in appearance, function, and price);
Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1988) (focusing on the
tarnishment theory and agreeing with the lower courts that no difference in quality was
present between defendant’s, Lanard’s, international security figures and plaintiff’s,
Hasbro’s, “G.I. JOE” and “GUNG-HO” action figures); Artisan Mfg. Corp. v. All Granite &
Marble Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 442, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (considering only the tarnishment
theory and holding that the factor was irrelevant where evidence of sink inferiority was not
present); Lemme v.NBC, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 433, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying the
tarnishment theory when dealing with the quality factor and determining that NBC’s show
was superior in quality to the local talk show); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (eliminating the quality factor by suggesting
that the tarnishment theory was the only relevant theory and evidence of inferiority was
not present).
58
See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 460–61 (2d Cir. 2004) (outlining the
application of the similarity theory to the likelihood of confusion test and acknowledging
that because the products were not equivalent, there was no additional confusion); Plus
Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1006–07 (2d Cir. 1983) (overruling the lower
court’s use of the tarnishment theory and implementing the similarity theory in favor of the
defendant by acknowledging a significant difference in the parties’ product quality, but
noting that the parties were serving a different consumer base); Constellation Brands, Inc.
v. Arbor Hill Assocs., 535 F. Supp. 2d 347, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that proof that a
defendant’s product is cheaper is not per se proof of inferiority, that differences in quality
may just be considered as referring to a different segment of consumers, and that a distinct
difference in quality may weigh against finding a likelihood of consumer confusion);
Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 30–31 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the
similarity theory with limited force by recognizing that nearly identical products in style
and quality are likely to confuse consumers as to their source); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recognizing that similar goods of
matching quality may likely confuse the consumer as to their source); In re Leslie Fay Cos.,
216 B.R. 117, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing only the similarity factor and determining
that the distinction in quality was not significant enough to prevent confusion). But see,
e.g., MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (disagreeing with the similarity theory). “The quality comparison factor concerns
56
57
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the Second Circuit still created a third theory focused on the senior user’s
ability to control the quality of his goods and therefore control his
reputation.59 These three theories have been arbitrarily applied on an
individual and combined basis to different trademark infringement cases
without any logical rhyme or reason.60
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have also disagreed about the proper
theory to be applied to the quality factor in a trademark infringement
case.61 These circuits generally alternate between applying the
tarnishment theory and the quality-control theory.62 Therefore, a
itself not so much with the likelihood of confusion as with the likelihood of harm resulting
from any such confusion.” Id.
59
See, e.g., Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (ignoring both
the tarnishment and similarity theories, the court acknowledged the existence of a qualitycontrol theory). “[U]nless the borrower’s use is so foreign to the owner’s as to insure
against any identification of the two, it is unlawful.” Id.; Warner-Lambert Co. v. Schick
U.S.A., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 141 (D. Conn. 1996) (ignoring the actual quality of goods and
determining that regardless of actual quality, an “Identify the Anti-Christ” promotion by
the defendant was likely to cause harm to the plaintiff’s reputation because the plaintiff lost
control of the quality of its goods); Cont’l Connector Corp. v. Cont’l Specialties Corp., 492
F. Supp. 1088, 1094 n.4 (D. Conn. 1979) (noting that a plaintiff’s reputation is affected
regardless of defendant’s product quality because the defendant can hold the reputation
hostage).
60
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have applied these
three theories). See also The Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, LLC,
182 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 1999) (agreeing with the lower court’s analysis of the tarnishment
theory, but explaining that the lower court erred in not considering the similarity theory in
its analysis); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1996)
(acknowledging both the tarnishment and similarity theory, but reasoning that Spa’am, the
Henson’s Muppet character, was a positive character and not unhygienic, and therefore the
SPAM luncheon meat creator’s tarnishment theory was inadequate); 24 Hour Fitness USA,
Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, L.L.C., 447 F. Supp. 2d 266, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining
initially its willingness to adopt either the tarnishment theory or the similarity theory, but
determining that any quality difference was not distinct enough to change the already
determined ruling of the court); Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 351,
368 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining initially its willingness to adopt either the tarnishment
theory or the similarity theory, but noting that the court will not address the quality factor
unless the parties present sufficient evidence); McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F.
Supp. 1268, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (initially recognizing the tarnishment theory, but quickly
explaining that quality is not an essential factor because companies deserve protection of
their marks regardless of the quality of the second user’s product).
61
See infra note 62 and accompanying text (outlining the intra-circuit split in the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits).
62
See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996) (considering
only the tarnishment theory and explaining that quality considerations are most
appropriate in cheap copy or knock-off cases, the court determined that the quality factor is
irrelevant in cases dealing with goods other then cheap copies or knock-offs); Perini Corp.
v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127–28 (4th Cir 1990) (adopting the quality factor as a
protection for the consumer’s interest in quality and cost of the goods and services offered);
George & Co., L.L.C. v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., No. 1:07cv498(LMB/TRJ), 2008 WL
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plaintiff filing a trademark infringement case within these circuits, all
other factors being equal, will most likely prevail if the defendant has
inferior goods to those of the plaintiff.63
3.

The Sixth Circuit’s Unique Holding and Its Effect on the Tenth
Circuit

In 2005, the Sixth Circuit, in Gibson Guitar, determined that when
both parties have high quality goods and point-of-sale confusion has not
occurred, the court need not consider initial-interest confusion or postsale confusion in determining whether an infringement has occurred
under the likelihood of consumer confusion test.64 This holding clearly
2883771, *7 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2008) (refusing to consider the similarity theory, the court
considered the price of the goods when evaluating the quality factor under the tarnishment
theory and classified the factor as irrelevant based upon a determination that the goods
were of equal quality); Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 970
(S.D. Tex. 1997) (considering the quality factor under the tarnishment theory to the degree
that a reconditioned product’s inferior quality would be recognized by the reasonable
purchaser as being associated with the manufacturer). But see Paulsson Geophysical Servs.,
Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the district court’s adoption of
the quality-control theory but noting that the circuit court has avoided adopting this
presumption of irreparable harm); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th
Cir. 1984) (adopting the quality-control theory rather than the tarnishment or similarity
theory); DS Waters of Am., Inc. v. Princess Abita Water, LLC., 539 F. Supp. 2d 853, 863
(E.D. La. 2008) (holding that quality control is a significant factor in determining whether
irreparable harm can occur and arguing that this factor is relevant regardless of the actual
quality of defendant’s goods); Waples-Platter Cos. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551,
574 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (suggesting that actual quality of defendant’s goods is immaterial, but
exclusive control over the mark and good will is an essential element in trademark
infringement cases).
63
See supra note 62 and accompanying text (suggesting the benefit of bringing suit in the
Fourth or Fifth Circuit if the alleged infringer has an inferior good). This conclusion is
drawn from the understanding that both the tarnishment and quality-control theory will
view product inferiority as advantageous to the plaintiff.
64
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005). In
Gibson, the senior mark user, Gibson, introduced the Les Paul guitar and created the Les
Paul name as a single-cutaway electric guitar. Id. at 543–44. The Patent and Trademark
Office issued registration on July 29, 1987 and it became incontestable on September 27,
1999. Id. at 544. Paul Reed Smith Guitars displayed their first solid body, single-cutaway
electric guitar in February of 2000. Id. The court found no evidence of point-of-sale
confusion and determined that both companies were manufacturers of high quality guitars.
Id. at 543, 548. This finding led the court to ignore initial-interest confusion and post-sale
confusion. Id. at 553. The court then reversed the summary judgment awarded to Gibson
and remanded the case with an instruction to enter summary judgment in favor of Paul
Reed Smith. Id. at 553. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for
writ of certiorari on the following issue: “Whether a trademark infringer who sells a
‘knock-off’ product under the valid, incontestable trademark of another can be excused
from liability under the Lanham Act because the infringing product is ‘high-quality.’”
Gibson Guitar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at i.
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supports a tarnishment theory in initial interest and post-sale confusion
cases, while suggesting that point-of-sale confusion cases may apply the
similarity theory.65 By the end of 2005, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning had
already been adopted by the Tenth Circuit.66 This adoption will only
further expand the confusion caused by these inter-circuit and intracircuit splits.67 In order to understand the cure, this Note will explore the
status quo of trademark infringement analysis with a lens focused on the
quality factor.68
III. ANALYSIS
Courts continue to inconsistently apply the quality factor within the
likelihood of consumer confusion test when handling trademark
infringement cases.69 Part III of this Note explains the faults within the
current status quo of trademark infringement analysis: confusion among
circuits and within circuits relating to the proper application of the
quality factor under the likelihood of consumer confusion test.70 Part III
analyzes the basic legal trademark concepts in accordance with the
general problems discussed in Part II.C.1.71 Part III further covers the
elements necessary to understand the proposed alternative.72 Part III.A
describes the impact the status quo will have on the future of trademark
See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the Gibson decision).
See Gibson Guitar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s flawed reasoning has already trickled down
to subsequent district court decisions. See, e.g., Big Dog Motorcycles,
L.L.C. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 31059 *60 (D. Kan.
Dec. 2, 2005) (citing Gibson for the proposition that “post-sale
confusion could not serve as substitute for point-of-sale confusion
where allegedly infringing products were not clearly inferior to the
trademark holder’s product.”).
Id. at 14.
67
See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the Tenth Circuit’s adoption of
the Gibson court’s reasoning in determining that post-sale confusion is unavailable unless
the allegedly infringing product is clearly inferior to the plaintiff’s product).
68
See infra Part III (analyzing the legal concepts developed in Part II in accordance with
the general problem discussed in Part II.C.1).
69
See supra Part II.C (outlining various strategies courts utilize when applying the
quality factor to trademark infringement cases).
70
See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining the inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits on the issue of
the proper application of the quality factor to the likelihood of consumer confusion test in
trademark infringement cases).
71
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the general problem in resolving trademark
infringement cases created by a sharp divide among the circuit courts application of the
quality factor).
72
See infra Part IV (describing the proposed alternative to the current approaches used
by the circuits when applying the quality factor in resolving trademark infringement
cases).
65
66
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law, specifically focusing on the creation of confusion in the lower courts
as to the proper application of the quality factor.73 Next, Part III.B
explains the advantages and disadvantages of each of the three
approaches to applying the quality factor currently used by circuit courts
in resolving a trademark infringement case.74
A. Disarray Among the Lower Courts
Recognizing the low value of a confused judicial system, this Part
focuses on the adverse effects caused by the current analysis used in
resolving trademark infringement cases.75
This Part begins by
addressing the circuit split on the issue of applying the quality factor to
the likelihood of consumer confusion test, explains three separate areas
of disarray currently plaguing the circuit and district courts on this issue,
and announces the expected ramifications caused by such confusion.76
Part III.A.1 analyzes the disorder courts face when applying the initialinterest confusion, point-of-sale confusion, and post-sale confusion tests
in determining whether a trademark infringement has occurred.77 Part
III.A.2 explores the confusion courts face in determining which
characteristics the reasonably prudent consumer possesses.78 Finally,
Part III.A.3 examines the confusion courts face in determining what
factors should be considered when analyzing the quality of defendant’s
goods.79 The lower courts’ application of the quality factor is in disarray
exacerbating the problem created by the circuit split.80 The previously
discussed intra-circuit and inter-circuit splits serve as additional reasons
for reforming judicial application of the quality factor in resolving
trademark infringement cases.81 It is important to understand why the
See infra Part III.A (recognizing the future impact caused by maintaining the status
quo of analysis in a trademark infringement case).
74
See infra Part III.B (discussing the advantages and disadvantages to applying the
similarity, tarnishment, and quality-control theories in a trademark infringement case).
75
See infra Part III.A (recognizing the confusion caused by the current status quo of
trademark infringement analysis).
76
See infra Parts III.A.1–3 (exploring the various areas of confusion plaguing the circuit
and district courts in analyzing trademark infringement cases).
77
See infra Part III.A.1 (outlining the confusion caused by applying initial-interest
confusion, point-of-sale confusion, and post-sale confusion).
78
See infra Part III.A.2 (exploring the obstacle courts face in determining what qualifies
as a reasonably prudent consumer).
79
See infra Part III.A.3 (recognizing the contention among courts in determining what
elements or factors are relevant to establish the quality of defendant’s goods in a trademark
infringement case).
80
See supra Part II.C (recognizing the disarray among district court in applying the
quality factor to trademark infringement cases).
81
See supra Part II.C (describing the circuit courts’ various methods for applying the
quality factor to trademark infringement cases).
73
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quality factor affects lower court decisions in trademark infringement
cases.82 Additionally, it is important to explore the advantages and
disadvantages of each of the three theories currently applied by circuit
courts.83
1.

The Quality Factor Creates Additional Complications in the
Application of Initial-Interest Confusion and Post-Sale Confusion

Initial-interest confusion is a relatively new doctrine which has been
applied sporadically by the judiciary.84 The quality factor, under the
likelihood of consumer confusion test, is relevant to initial-interest
confusion because some courts and commentators have agreed that
initial-interest confusion should be analyzed within the guidelines of the
likelihood of consumer confusion test.85 However, applying the quality
factor as an element of the likelihood of consumer confusion test to the
initial-interest confusion doctrine has created an elevated state of lower
court disarray.86 Complications arise when a lower court is forced to

82
See infra Parts III.A.1–3 (discussing areas of trademark law affected by the utilization
of the quality factor in analyzing trademark infringement cases).
83
See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of applying the
tarnishment theory, similarity theory, and quality-control theory in resolving trademark
infringement cases).
84
MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 29, § 3:8. See supra note 32 and accompanying text
(defining initial-interest confusion and discussing the various elements of initial-interest
confusion). See also PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir.
2003) overruled on other grounds by KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). “This ‘initial interest confusion’ is recognized as an infringement
under the Lanham Act.” Id. at 253 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers Inc., 233 F.3d
456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000)).
85
E.g., MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 29, § 3:8 (“Initial confusion should be analyzed
in the context of the elements constituting the standard of likelihood of confusion.”);
NIMMER, supra note 32, § 6:52 (recognizing that some courts, including the Ninth Circuit,
have treated initial interest confusion as a separate type of confusion for which the
likelihood of consumer confusion test should be applied). But see NIMMER, supra note 32,
§ 6:52 (explaining that some courts, such as the Sixth Circuit in Gibson, treat the concept of
initial-interest confusion as a part of the likelihood of consumer confusion test instead of as
a completely different type of confusion for which the likelihood of consumer confusion
test should be applied).
86
See NIMMER, supra note 32, § 6:52 (recognizing the difficulties associated with the
application of the initial-interest confusion doctrine, which focuses on siphoning customers
for final purchase or at least siphoning customers to approach and enter the business
establishment). Nimmer argues:
The ultimate status of this concept, even in the Ninth Circuit, cannot be
predicted, but either as part of an overall multi-factor analysis, or as a
separate form of actionable confusion, the concept has limits grounded
in both the consideration of factors relevant to the existence of
confusion and in traditional trademark concepts associated with fair
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determine whether the quality factor is applicable to the initial-interest
confusion doctrine.87 Additionally, if applicable, lower courts are then
faced with additional complications when determining which theory of
the quality factor to apply to a case alleging trademark infringement.88
Lower courts are also plagued by the complications created when
applying the post-sale confusion doctrine in resolving a trademark
infringement case.89 A judiciary’s determination of which quality theory
to apply could potentially alter the result of the case.90 Such a dramatic
use and other permissible uses of a name to identify a separate or
related products (so-called nominative use).
Id.
87
See Deere & Co. v. MTD Holdings Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5936(LMM), 2004 WL 324890, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004). In Deere, the court recognized that the quality of a defendant’s
good may be irrelevant because the initial-interest doctrine considers the potential
consumer who may not purchase anything after he or she becomes aware of the source’s
actual identity. Id. (citing Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269
F.3d 270, 294 (3d Cir. 2001)). However, the court did recognize that a purpose for creating
the initial-interest confusion is generally based on a “bait and switch” strategy which
capitalizes on the goodwill of the plaintiff’s high quality goods. Id. Nonetheless, the court
determined that at the very least, the similarity of products and the consumer’s
sophistication or level of care employed when purchasing are relevant factors to consider
under the likelihood of consumer confusion test. Id. See also PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 253
(recognizing that providing a disclaimer acknowledging that the product or service is not
affiliated with the trademark owner after the consumer has already reached the place of
business is too late to prevent infringement).
88
See supra Part II.C (exploring the general problems created by circuit courts
sporadically applying the tarnishment theory, similarity theory, and quality-control theory:
three methods for applying the quality factor to the likelihood of consumer confusion test).
89
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the post-sale confusion doctrine
and analyzing district and circuit courts’ adoption of the post-sale confusion doctrine).
90
See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005).
In Gibson Guitar, the parties conceded that both the alleged infringer’s and the plaintiff’s
single-cutaway electric guitars were of high quality. Id. at 553. Specifically, the court held
that a guitar manufacturer producing an alleged infringing high quality guitar likely to
cause post-sale confusion would not harm the original mark owner and guitar
manufacturer. Id. If the court had adopted a similarity theory then the fact that both
manufacturers sold high quality guitars would promote a finding of likelihood of
confusion. Id. Furthermore, had the court adopted the quality-control theory then the
mere fact that the mark owner lost control over the goods would support finding a
likelihood of confusion. Id. The previous two assertions are supported by analyzing the
court’s rejection of the “smoky-bar theory of confusion.” Id. This theory recognized that
the mark owner loses control of the mark when the similar quality of the infringing guitar
provokes a musician to use the guitar. Id. See Gibson Guitar Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 19, at 11. The petitioner suggested that the court’s reasoning was flawed
because it did not consider losing control over the mark as a damage. Id. at 14.
Specifically, the petitioner suggested that “[t]he court’s decision will also significantly
impair the ability of trademark holders to enforce their rights, as it provides counterfeiters
with a loophole through which they can sidestep charges of infringement.” Id. See also
Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the inferior quality of
the fiberglass Ferrari replica kit attachments damaged Ferrari’s reputation from a post-sale
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effect on trademark law must be controlled through a uniform
application of the quality factor.91 However, this alone would not
resolve the dilemma plaguing lower courts.92 Lower courts face
additional complications when determining who is actually evaluating
the quality of the good: the potential purchaser in an initial-interest
confusion case, the purchaser in a point-of-sale confusion case, or the
public in a post-sale confusion case.93
2.

Lower Court Disagreement in Defining the Reasonably Prudent
Consumer that Evaluates the Quality of the Defendant’s Goods

“[T]he case law elaborating these considerations is based on an ad
hoc, impressionistic conception of sophistication; the courts have never
articulated anything approaching a rigorous, theoretical understanding
of consumer care.”94 A court’s assessment of the reasonably prudent
person is most valuable in point-of-sale confusion cases and should play
little to no role in initial-interest confusion and post-sale confusion cases
because third parties, regardless of their sophistication, lack the incentive
to properly evaluate the good’s quality.95 Even in point-of-sale confusion

confusion context). See generally ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 34, § 22:11 (discussing
post-sale confusion cases and the dangers caused by such knock-off goods). Altman and
Pollack also recognize that in certain cases a “failure to take postsale confusion into account
require[s] reversal of finding of noninfringement[.]” Id. § 22:11 n.12.
91
See Sheff, supra note 35, at 344–45 (recognizing that a lack of uniformity within any
trademark element is a “generalized concern at the heart of trademark law”).
92
See infra Parts III.A.2–3 (discussing the contention that exists among lower courts in
determining what composes a reasonably prudent consumer and what factors should be
applied in determining the quality of defendant’s goods or services in a trademark
infringement case).
93
See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the lower courts’ difficulty in determining who
qualifies as a reasonably prudent consumer in a trademark infringement case).
94
Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 581.
95
See id. at 647 (recognizing that care and sophistication can justify diminishing the
likelihood of confusion among point-of-sale purchasers). However, the authors further
recognize that “no amount of care or sophistication among point-of-sale purchasers will
diminish the likelihood of cognizable confusion by third parties beyond the point of sale.”
Id. Lee, Christensen, and DeRosia argue:
Instead, in cases of cognizable post-sale confusion, the relevant
sophistication is that of the third parties who may view the
trademarked products in use. And such third parties are extremely
unlikely to exercise the extended cognition necessary to perform the
source-identification judgment with any accuracy, given that (1) there
are unlikely to be any significant risk factors implicated in the context
of a casual post-sale encounter with someone else’s trademarked item;
(2) there will often be time constraints and other situational limitations
on the opportunity for extended cognition; and (3) the junior mark is
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cases, a sophisticated consumer who has both the motivation and ability
to analyze the product may be unable to fully evaluate the product’s
quality without first purchasing and consuming the product.96 This

often a bad-faith counterfeit carefully contrived so that only an expert
would be able to distinguish it from an original.
Id. Furthermore, consumer care and sophistication is completely irrelevant under the
initial-interest confusion doctrine. Id. at 647–48. This conclusion is supported by the basic
understanding that “the expectation of a high level of care at later stages of the transaction”
does not dispel a claim of initial-interest confusion. Id. at 648. Moreover, the authors
acknowledge that “certain forms of consumer sophistication may only exacerbate the
likelihood of initial-interest confusion.” Id. Lee, Christensen, and DeRosia further note,
“where sophistication is rooted in enduring involvement in or repeated exposure to a
senior mark or product category, the sophisticated consumer may be the one most likely to
develop an initial interest in a junior mark that at first glance appears similar.” Id at 649.
(citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986)). The
authors also recognize that courts have determined that “initial interest
confusion . . . typically defeats the sophisticated purchaser defense[,]” which recognizes
that a sophisticated consumer takes the necessary precautions to ensure he or she is not
actually confused about the item being purchased. Id. at 582–83. (alterations in original)
(quoting SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. SecuraCom Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286, 299 (D.N.J.
1997)). The authors further note that courts have reasoned that “sophistication does not
obviate the possibility that they may ‘mistakenly’ find a ‘connection’ with the senior
trademark holder and ‘develop an interest . . . that [they] would not otherwise have had.’”
Id. at 582. (alterations in original) (quoting Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 1167, 1180 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)). See also Sheff, supra note 35, at 367 (explaining that
similar stimuli can play tricks on the human mind). Specifically, Sheff notes that
“[m]emory can play . . . tricks on us, particularly when a novel, distorted, or misplaced
stimulus is presented in a context where we would expect to encounter a similar, familiar
stimulus.” Id. Furthermore, Sheff suggests that a consumer can miss quality discrepancies
after a stimulus has been triggered. Id.
96
Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 584. The authors use the following
diagram to help explain the relevance of motivation and ability to consumer care:
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necessity further complicates a judiciary’s use of the reasonably prudent
consumer standard in resolving trademark infringement cases.97
The standard used in determining the reasonably prudent
consumer’s effect on the likelihood of consumer confusion stemming
from a trademark use is further complicated by courts adopting different
methods for applying the quality factor.98 The level of care a consumer
exercises during the purchasing process is irrelevant to his or her
likelihood of noticing quality discrepancies after purchasing the good.99

Id. at 589.
See id. at 578–79 (“[C]ourts may simply be ‘adjusting their finding of whether the
relevant consumer population is sophisticated or unsophisticated to conform to the result
they wish to achieve.’” (quoting Beebe, supra note 28, at 2040.))
98
See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (describing the complications arising
from the application of each quality theory to trademark infringement cases).
99
See Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 579–80. Lee, Christensen, and
DeRosia argue:
A sophisticated consumer is expected to act not on impulse, but on the
basis of a careful consideration of the reliability and dependability of
the manufacturer and seller of the product. . . . [A]nd who is thus
deemed less likely to be confused as to the source or sponsorship of the
trademarked products she buys. Unsophisticated consumers, by
contrast, are the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, who, in
97
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Under this general view, the tarnishment theory only protects a
consumer that is sophisticated enough to notice a discrepancy in quality
between the alleged infringer’s good and the trademark owner’s good,
but not sophisticated enough during the purchasing process as to
eliminate the applicability of the likelihood of confusion test.100
However, under the similarity theory, both sophisticated and
unsophisticated consumers are likely to be confused by the similarity in
quality between the alleged infringer’s good and the trademark owner’s
good.101 Finally, under the quality-control theory, the consumer’s level
of sophistication is irrelevant to the likelihood of consumer confusion
test because the mark owner has already lost his ability to control the
mark.102

making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by
appearance and general impressions.
The prototypical
unsophisticated consumer is the man walking the supermarket aisle
who undergoes an experience not unlike that of hypnosis, in which
purchases are made impulsively and thoughtlessly.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes and quotations omitted).
100
See id. at 581. The authors recognize the split among circuits regarding the weight
accredited to buyer sophistication. Id. Specifically, the authors mention that some courts
will interpret a market of highly sophisticated or professional consumers as evidence
necessary to supersede the entire likelihood of consumer confusion test, eliminating the
quality factor. Id.; Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citing Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128 (4th Cir. 1990)). Other courts
limit the importance of consumer sophistication as only one small element of the likelihood
of consumer confusion test. Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 581. See also
PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) overruled on other
grounds by KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)
(recognizing that the typical standard applied by courts in determining consumer
sophistication is an ordinarily cautious buyer, but noting that higher standard is proper for
more sophisticated buyers); MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 29, § 3:8 (recognizing that
some courts apply a more general ordinary person standard guided by a “‘normal measure
of the layman’s common sense and judgment’” in determining the level of consumer
sophistication (quoting A1 Mortgage Corp. v. A1 Mortgage & Fin. Servs., L.L.C., No. 2:03CV-2002, 2006 WL 1437744 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2006))).
101
See Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 35, at 587, 646. “The courts have generally
held that if consumers exercise a low degree of care, likelihood of confusion in the
marketplace will be increased.” Id. at 587. Simultaneously, “high levels of involvement
might even be expected to exacerbate the likelihood of sponsorship confusion[.]” Id. at 646.
This is true because a consumer exercising high levels of care “can only increase the
perception of a connection between two disparate uses of the same trademark, and no
amount of additional comparison of the two marks is likely to dispel it.” Id.
102
See id. at 583. When a mark owner loses control over the mark and a consumer
identifies an infringer’s product with the mark owner, then the consumer will infer the
product’s traits and quality as being equal to the mark owner’s product. Id.
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Lower Courts Face Additional Complications in Determining What
Attributes to Consider Under the Quality Factor

Courts and commentators have listed several relevant company,
product, and service attributes to be considered as a part of the quality of
defendant’s goods, ranging from the product or service itself to the
company’s advertisements and environmental policies.103 This wide
range of discretion complicates the court’s application of its chosen
quality analysis theory.104 Since trademark law focuses on the context of
the specific case, a court can suggest using certain attributes in particular
cases and thus find infringement or non-infringement under either the
tarnishment theory, similarity theory, or quality-control theory.105 This
complication serves as additional support for removing the quality factor
from the liability stage of analysis in a trademark infringement case.106
Nonetheless, it is important to understand the benefits and detriments of
each quality theory.107

See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (outlining the attributes considered as
relevant to the analysis of the quality of defendant’s goods in trademark infringement
cases).
104
See infra note 105 and accompanying text (recognizing the complications arising from
an analysis of the attributes of the quality of defendant’s goods in a trademark
infringement case).
105
See Leon, supra note 42, at 978. Leon recognizes the contextual nature of trademark
law by establishing that “[i]n commercial advertising the quality of the advertisement may
reflect the quality of the product.” Id. W. Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d
57, 63 (2d Cir. 1990). The court reasoned that in the context of a family mark being used by
another company, the product itself is the only item that should be used when considering
the quality of defendant’s goods. Id. Additionally, Attiya Malik cites a case which
recognized that in the context of domain names and home page addresses, the general
image or message the orgaization or compay portrays is relevant. Malik, supra note 42, at
460 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997)); Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp.
2d 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (suggesting that in the context of an industrial-strength septic
system cleaning product, experience was an invalid attribute to consider when evaluating
the quality of defendant’s goods); MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F.
Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (determining that in the context of the Pink Panther mark,
image was an important, necessary attribute to consider when analyzing the quality of
defendant’s goods).
106
Bone, supra note 42, at 2152 n.150 (suggesting that adding a quality comparison is
likely to promote litigation and increase administrative and error costs).
107
See infra Part III.B (outlining the advantages and disadvantages of applying the
tarnishment, similarity, and quality-control theories to the quality of defendant’s goods in
the likelihood of consumer confusion test for trademark infringement cases).
103
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B. Advantages & Disadvantages of the Three Quality Theories
After analyzing the continued contention among lower courts
regarding the future of the quality factor, Part III.B concentrates on each
of the three quality theories under the point-of-sale confusion doctrine.108
Part III.B.1 examines the advantages and disadvantages of using the
tarnishment theory in applying the quality factor under the likelihood of
consumer confusion test to a trademark infringement case.109 Next, Part
III.B.2 analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of using the similarity
theory in applying the quality factor in a trademark infringement case.110
Finally, Part III.B.3 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
applying the quality-control theory to the quality factor in a trademark
infringement case.111
1.

The Tarnishment Theory

The tarnishment theory has two advantages and two
disadvantages.112 First, the tarnishment theory allows the court to focus
on the likelihood of expected harm stemming from the continued use of
the alleged infringer’s mark.113 Second, the tarnishment theory can be a
safeguard in protecting the consumer’s interest by preventing the sale of
poor quality goods.114
However, with these benefits comes an
108
See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the
tarnishment theory, the similarity theory, and the quality-control theory).
109
See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages to using the
tarnishment theory in trademark infringement cases).
110
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages to using the
similarity theory in trademark infringement cases).
111
See infra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages to using the qualitycontrol theory in trademark infringement cases).
112
See infra notes 113–18 and accompanying text (describing each individual advantage
and disadvantage of the tarnishment theory).
113
E.g., MGM-Pathe Commc’s Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (recognizing the tarnishment theory). Under the tarnishment theory “[t]he quality
comparison factor concerns itself . . . with the likelihood of harm resulting from any such
confusion.” Id. In MGM, the court held that the tarnishment theory helps prevent an
alleged infringer from using a mark that is likely to be destructive to the image and
goodwill of the senior user’s mark. Id. See also Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics,
Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 970 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (recognizing the quality factor under a
tarnishment theory title). The court analyzed, as its eleventh element of the likelihood of
consumer confusion test, “the degree to which any inferior qualities associated with the
reconditioned product would likely to be identified by the typical purchaser with the
manufacturer.” Id.
114
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Perini Corp.
v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128 (4th Cir 1990) (recognizing that the tarnishment
theory serves the general public’s interest by protecting it from low quality goods). The
Qualitex court concludes:
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understanding that the tarnishment theory focuses on dilution rather
than confusion to the consumer.115 This focus may seem counterintuitive
to courts using the tarnishment theory because it is being applied as a
factor of the likelihood of consumer confusion test.116 Moreover,
products of a distinctly different quality are less likely to be confused
with each other.117 Therefore, the tarnishment theory is likely to prevent
a finding of consumer confusion in those cases where confusion is most
likely to occur because the tarnishment theory, unlike the similarity

[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a sourceidentifying mark, reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a
potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by
the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked
(or disliked) in the past. . . . The law thereby encourages the
production of quality products and simultaneously discourages those
who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s
inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.
Qualitex., 514 U.S. at 163–64. (citations and internal quotations omitted). See also Henry v.
Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1350 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that trademark infringement may
prevent the sale of goods which are “seconds” of inferior quality and prevent the sale of
goods that have been tainted by mishandling). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. b (1995) (recognizing that defrauded purchasers were
expected to bring suit against trademark infringers in the Roman times).
115
E.g., Playmakers L.L.C. v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Tarnishment
may be a theory of liability or a type of harm, but it is not itself a factor to be considered in
determining whether consumer confusion is likely.”).
116
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (noting
that the quality factor is one factor considered under the likelihood of consumer confusion
test). See also Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 970 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (differentiating between the likelihood of consumer confusion factors and an
additional factor applied by the court titled “(11) the degree to which any inferior qualities
associated with the reconditioned product would likely to be identified by the typical
purchaser with the manufacturer”). In Neles-Jamesbury, the court recognized the importance
of this factor applied to the facts of this particular case but clearly separated it from the
factors which logically focus on identifying the possibility for consumer confusion. Id.
Additionally, the court implied that this factor might be superfluous by noting that it
combines elements of a number of the likelihood of consumer confusion factors. Id. at 976.
117
E.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1987) (“If
there is a difference in quality between the [products], the public is less likely to be
confused. A showing that products are of dissimilar quality affords no support for a
finding of a likelihood of confusion.”). See also Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722
F.2d 999, 1006–07 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that marked differences between the quality of the
two parties’ goods supports a finding against likelihood of confusion). The court in Plus
Products justified this conclusion by recognizing that the mark owner targeted a special
consumer market who desires natural ingredients and high nutritional value, where the
alleged infringer targeted consumers who were “cost conscious shoppers looking for
garden-variety grocery items which are sold at bargain-basement prices.” Id. at 1007. The
court explained that such a distinction is likely to lower the likelihood of confusion in even
the unsophisticated consumer. Id.
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theory discussed in Part III.B.2, holds that products of similar quality
weigh against a finding of consumer confusion.118
2.

The Similarity Theory

The similarity theory has two advantages and two disadvantages.119
First, the similarity theory recognizes the likelihood of confusion caused
by similarities in product quality.120 Conversely, the similarity theory
recognizes that differences in quality are more likely to cause a consumer
to recognize the difference in sponsorship or source of the good.121
118
See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996) (suggesting
that pantyhose of similar quality are less likely to be confused then pantyhose of vastly
different quality); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir.
1996) (suggesting that a positive, not lesser quality, cartoon character with a trademarked
name does not support a finding of sponsorship confusion because the character was not
inferior to that of the trademarked good and was not related in make-up or usage); Hasbro,
Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (suggesting that the quality factor
did not support likelihood of confusion where the infringers international security figures
were not of lesser quality then the mark owners military action figures); George & Co.,
L.L.C. v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., No. 1:07cv498(LMB/TRJ), 2008 WL 2883771, *7 (E.D. Va.
July 25, 2008) (suggesting that likelihood of confusion is less likely to occur where a
company used the mark “Left Center Right” for a product of great similarity to that of a
“LCR” mark owner because the products were sold at the same price and were of a similar
quality); Artisan Mfg. Corp. v. All Granite & Marble Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 442, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (suggesting that the quality factor is irrelevant where the alleged infringer
made the same product, eighteen-gauge sinks, as the mark owner and inferiority was not
proven); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (suggesting that the quality factor is irrelevant where a company uses “Kids ‘r’ Us” as
their mark for toy products of similar quality to the “Toys ‘R’ Us” mark owner). But see
Lemme v. NBC, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 433, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that an infringing
national broadcast company who was vastly superior in quality to the local broadcast mark
owner supported a finding against likelihood of confusion). See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing
the advantages and disadvantages to using the similarity theory in trademark infringement
cases).
119
See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (explaining the advantages and
disadvantages to using the similarity theory in applying the quality factor in a trademark
infringement case).
120
See, e.g., Constellation Brands, Inc. v. Arbor Hill Assocs., 535 F. Supp. 2d 347, 370
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (suggesting that the quality factor relates to harm and not confusion;
however the court noted that two products that are not markedly different under a quality
analysis could generate confusion as to who actually produced each product); Jordache, 841
F. Supp. at 520 (recognizing that the parties’ admission of both manufacturing quality jeans
strengthened an inference that consumers will believe that they originated from the same
source); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 216 B.R. 117, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (acknowledging that the two
parties’ ties were not distinctly different from a quality perspective and thus were likely to
be confused).
121
See, e.g., Constellation Brands, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (noting that the two wines
produced by the parties were not markedly different under a quality analysis so as to
militate against a finding of confusion stemming from the wines); Savin Corp. v. Savin
Group, 391 F.3d 439, 461 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that in cases where lesser quality
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However, these similarities may be irrelevant where the products differ
in appearance, function and price.122
Furthermore, applying the
similarity theory to the quality factor is unnecessary when the similarity
theory is also applied to the proximity factor, which has been adopted by
every circuit.123 Finally, it is important to recognize that the quality
factor becomes inconsequential when both the similarity and
tarnishment theories are applied to the quality factor.124 Therefore, some

products are produced by the alleged infringer, consumers will be less likely to presume
the low quality product was created by the same mark owner that prides itself on
delivering high quality goods).
122
Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 398 (2d Cir. 1995) (suggesting that
the similarity theory is inapplicable where the two products differ in appearance, function,
and price). But see MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (recognizing the irrelevance possibly caused by distinct differences in the
good’s nature and function, but also noting that this irrelevance is only true in certain
contexts). The court in Pink Panther Patrol recognized that:
It is indeed entirely likely that a large percentage of the population of
the United States might see and hear both plaintiff’s and defendant’s
names during a single evening of nationwide television broadcasting,
if a telecast of an MGM film should be followed by a newscast
including reference to the Patrol’s activities.
Id.
123
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1995) (“[T]he degree of
similarity in the marketing methods and channels of distribution used for the respective
goods or services[.]”); Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In examining [the
proximity] factor a court should compare all aspects of the products, including price, style,
intended uses, target clientele, typical distribution channels, and others.” (quoting
Brockmeyer v. Hearst Corp., No. 01 Civ. 7746 (JGK), 2002 WL 1402320, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June
27, 2002) (internal quotations omitted))); Beebe, supra note 28, at 1589 (noting that all of the
circuits have adopted the proximity or similarity of the goods factor under the likelihood of
consumer confusion test). See also, e.g., Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 460 (recognizing that the
general class of the products, which should include quality, is a relevant consideration
under the proximity factor); Jordache, 841 F. Supp. at 517 (including the following factors
under the proximity of the products factor: appearance, style, function, fashion appeal,
advertising orientation, and price); supra Part II.B.2 (recognizing that these factors are also
elements which have been considered under the quality factor); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 216
B.R. at 129, 131 (establishing price as a determinative element under both the proximity
factor and quality factor). But see Constellation Brands, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (noting that
price alone does not negate the proximity factor or determine by itself whether the parties
are competitors).
124
See, e.g., Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133,
142 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that adopting both the tarnishment theory and similarity
theory “cuts both ways” in favor of the plaintiff); 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca
Fitness, L.L.C., 447 F. Supp. 2d 266, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing both the tarnishment
theory and similarity theory); Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing that by adopting both the tarnishment theory and similarity
theory this factor is likely to favor plaintiff); Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, Inc., 146 F.
Supp. 2d 351, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (recognizing both the tarnishment theory and similarity
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courts have chosen to apply the quality-control theory as discussed in
Part III.B.3.125
3.

The Quality-Control Theory

The quality-control theory’s application to the quality factor in the
likelihood of consumer confusion test has one advantage and one
disadvantage.126 Unlike the tarnishment and similarity theories, the
quality-control theory protects a trademark owner from alleged
infringers with superior goods.127 However, similar to courts which
adopt both the tarnishment theory and similarity theory, courts adopting
the quality-control theory strongly favor plaintiffs in trademark
infringement suits by creating an almost per se rule of invalidity.128
Nonetheless, the mark itself must be confusingly similar in order to
justify a finding of trademark infringement.129 This still does not explain

theory, but noting that the court cannot address either if no evidence is submitted on the
topic).
125
See infra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages to using the qualitycontrol theory in trademark infringement cases).
126
See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text (describing the advantage and
disadvantage of applying the quality-control theory to the quality factor in a likelihood of
confusion case).
127
See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Ala. Farmers Fed’n, 935 F. Supp. 1533, 1546 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (“Even if a defendant’s product rivals or exceeds the quality of a registrant’s
product, the unauthorized product is still trademark infringement because it deprives the
registrant of its ability to shape the contours of its reputation.”); Brach Van Houten
Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 474 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(“Trademark infringement will lie even when a defendant’s product is superior to the
product of the trademark owner, simply because of the potential for damage to reputation
where the trademark owner has no control over the quality of the defendant’s product or
service.”); Waples-Platter Cos. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 574 (N.D. Tex. 1977)
(“[T]he actual quality of the subsequent user’s product is normally immaterial. Even if the
subsequent user’s product is of higher quality than that of the prior user, the prior user has
lost the exclusive control of his mark and his good will and, if there is a likelihood of
confusion, has suffered infringement.”); Juvenile Shoe Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 57, 59 (9th Cir.
1923).
128
See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (acknowledging the
quality-control theory, after discounting both the tarnishment and similarity theories). The
court explained that “unless the borrower’s use is so foreign to the owner’s as to insure
against any identification of the two, it is unlawful.” Id.; Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering
Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[A company’s] loss of
control over its reputation justifies a finding of irreparable harm even if it could
demonstrate no loss of sales or market share.”). But see Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v.
Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (avoiding the presumptive adoption of irreparable
harm stemming from a lack of control over the quality of defendant’s goods).
129
Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. v. Barrow, 143 F. App’x 180, 191 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing
that under the quality-control theory a plaintiff must show that a consumer is likely to be
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why a court should apply a rule of invalidity to the likelihood of
consumer confusion test.130 Therefore, each of the three quality theories
has significant individual flaws and lends to discrepancies among lower
courts when each quality theory is applied on an erroneous ad hoc
basis.131
The current state of trademark infringement law, as a result, is in
disarray.132 Steps must be taken to create a single likelihood of consumer
confusion test that can be uniformly applied by the judiciary.133 The first
step to creating a uniform likelihood of consumer confusion test is to
properly analyze each factor.134 While analyzing each factor of the
likelihood of consumer confusion test is beyond the scope of this Note,
the most severe complications created by the test can be solved by
unifying circuit courts’ application of the quality factor within the
likelihood of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement
cases.135 Part IV proposes an alternative to the current application of the
confused in addition to noting that he or she will suffer irreparable injury due to the lack of
control over the quality of defendant’s goods).
130
Under this per se rule of invalidity, the reputation and goodwill created by the senior
user’s mark is affected regardless of the quality of defendant’s goods. See Pizzeria Uno
Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that when someone
barrows a mark owner’s reputation, the mark owner has lost control over the mark even
where the borrower does not attempt to tarnish the mark); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Schick
U.S.A., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 141 (D. Conn. 1996) (suggesting that the quality of one’s
goods is irrelevant if a party cannot maintain his or her reputation); McDonald’s Corp. v.
McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (suggesting that plaintiffs are
entitled to protection of reputation regardless of the current quality of defendant’s goods);
Cont’l Connector Corp. v. Cont’l Specialties Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 n.4 (D. Conn.
1979) (recognizing that confusion between two products can allow an infringing party to
hold the plaintiff’s reputation hostage regardless of product quality).
131
See supra Part III.B (describing the minor benefits and serious flaws of each quality
theories).
132
See supra Part III (noting the many complications arising from federal courts ad hoc
use of the three various theories in applying the quality of defendant’s goods to the
likelihood of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement cases).
133
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (recognizing that each circuit has created its
own multifactor test for determining the likelihood of consumer confusion in a trademark
infringement case).
134
See supra note 91 (recognizing that uniformity within each trademark element,
including each factor applied in the likelihood of consumer confusion test, is necessary to
the heart of trademark law).
135
See infra Part IV (outlining a method for preventing the current state of disarray
created by using the quality of defendant’s goods as a factor in determining whether a
consumer will likely be confused as to the source of a specific mark); supra note 52 and
accompanying text (recognizing the discretion courts have when choosing to apply the
theory of quality that fits the judiciaries chosen outcome for the case); supra note 115 and
accompanying text (emphasizing that unlike the other factors applied by the circuit courts’
individual multifactor tests, the quality of defendant’s goods can be applied in a way
which does not actually create consumer confusion).
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quality of defendant’s goods in a way which maintains the advantages of
each quality theory while eliminating the complications and
disadvantages created by the current competing methods used in
applying each theory to the likelihood of consumer confusion test in
trademark infringement cases.136
IV. PROPOSED METHOD FOR APPLYING THE QUALITY OF DEFENDANT’S
GOODS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONSUMER CONFUSION TEST IN A
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASE
As Part II.B recognized, each circuit has adopted its own factors for
analyzing the likelihood of consumer confusion in trademark
infringement cases.137 Furthermore, Part II.C explained that circuit
courts sporadically use three different approaches in applying the
quality of defendant’s goods to the likelihood of consumer confusion
test.138 These applications were then examined in Part III.B to outline the
advantages and disadvantages of each quality theory.139 Next, this Part
focuses on providing a new method for applying the quality of
defendant’s goods to trademark infringement cases.140
Specifically, the proposed alternative presents three key steps to
altering the current common law procedures applied by circuit courts in
considering the quality of defendant’s goods in trademark infringement
cases.141 First, Part IV.A discusses the importance of eliminating the
quality of defendant’s goods as an individual factor from the likelihood
of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement cases.142 Second,
Part IV.B outlines the reasons for including the quality of defendant’s

136
See infra Part IV (announcing the proposed changes to the current trademark
infringement common law and specifically focusing on the necessary adjustments to the
courts current methods for applying the quality of defendant’s goods to trademark
infringement cases).
137
See supra Part II.B (analyzing trademark infringement and the likelihood of consumer
confusion test).
138
See supra Part II.C (examining the various splits among the circuits regarding the
application of the tarnishment, similarity, and quality-control theories to the likelihood of
consumer confusion test in trademark infringement cases).
139
See supra Part III.B (outlining the advantages and disadvantages to applying the
tarnishment, similarity, and quality-control theories to the likelihood of consumer
confusion test in trademark infringement cases).
140
See infra Part IV (explaining several adjustments to the current use of the tarnishment,
similarity, and quality-control theories in trademark infringement cases).
141
See infra Parts IV.A–C (delineating, separately, each step of the proposed alternative to
the current use of quality of defendant’s goods in a trademark infringement case).
142
See infra Part IV.A (suggesting eliminating the quality of defendant’s goods, as its own
factor, from the likelihood of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement cases).
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goods under the proximity factor as an element of similarity.143 Third,
Part IV.C recognizes the importance of incorporating the quality of
defendant’s goods into the assessment of damages and relief.144 Finally,
Part IV.D integrates the three common law alterations into the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and Part IV.E applies the
proposed alterations to the introductory hypothetical.145
A. Eliminating the Quality of Defendant’s Goods as an Individual Factor from
the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion Test
Choosing to uniformly apply one quality theory to the individual
quality factor is an insufficient method for solving the disarray created
by the factor because the detriments related to the chosen quality theory
will still exist.146 Therefore, the first step to solving the disarray created
among federal courts, regarding the introduction of the quality of
defendant’s goods factor to the likelihood of consumer confusion test in
trademark infringement cases, is to remove the individual factor from
the test.147 Completely removing this individual factor from the test will
allow circuit courts to focus the likelihood of consumer confusion test on
the existence of consumer confusion.148 Although the quality of
defendant’s goods should not be considered as its own factor, it should

See infra Part IV.B (recommending the inclusion of quality of defendant’s goods into
the proximity factor from a similarity perspective).
144
See infra Part IV.C (indicating that the quality of defendant’s goods should be a factor
used to determine the appropriate relief in trademark infringement cases).
145
See infra Part IV.D (suggesting a specific method for integrating the proposed common
law alterations to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION); infra Part IV.E
(applying the proposed common law alterations to the introductory hypothetical).
146
See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages to
applying the tarnishment theory to the individual quality of defendant’s goods factor in the
likelihood of consumer confusion test); supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text
(discussing the disadvantages to applying the similarity theory to the individual quality of
defendant’s goods factor in the likelihood of consumer confusion test); supra notes 128, 130
and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantage to applying the quality-control theory
to the individual quality of defendant’s goods factor in the likelihood of consumer
confusion test).
147
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that using the quality of defendant’s
goods to act as its own single factor in the likelihood of consumer confusion test currently
provides judges with the discretion to make the quality factor fit the outcome the judge has
chosen for the case).
148
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (recognizing that products of a distinctly
different quality do not actually show a likelihood of consumer confusion); supra note 123
and accompanying text (suggesting that products of a similar quality should be considered
under the proximity factor, adopted by every circuit, and not under an individual quality
of defendants good’s factor).
143

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/8

Olsen: Mixed Signals in Trademark's "Likelihood of Confusion Law": Does

2010]

Mixed Signals

697

still be considered as a subpart to the proximity factor in the likelihood
of consumer confusion test.149
B. Applying the Quality of Defendant’s Goods to the Proximity Factor in the
Likelihood of Consumer Confusion Test
Considering the quality of defendant’s goods under the similarity
theory produces certain benefits that should be maintained within the
likelihood of consumer confusion test.150 Therefore, to maintain the
benefits of the similarity theory, the proximity factor which has been
adopted by every circuit should include, as a subpart, the quality of
defendant’s goods from a similarity perspective.151 However, this
subpart should only be considered when analyzing a trademark
infringement suit based on the point-of-sale confusion doctrine because
the quality factor is not relevant to initial-interest and post-sale confusion
suits.152 Furthermore, the term quality in “quality of defendant’s goods”
under the altered proximity factor should be limited to the quality of the
good itself and should not consider any additional elements.153 The
quality of defendant’s goods should be considered from the perspective
of a reasonably prudent consumer.154
Although the quality of
See infra Part IV.B (applying the quality of defendant’s good to the proximity factor in
the likelihood of consumer confusion test for trademark infringement suits).
150
See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits provided by
applying a similarity theory to the quality of defendant’s goods).
151
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that similar quality products should
be considered under the proximity factor which has been adopted by every circuit).
152
See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the elements of the initial-interest, point-of-sale, and
post-sale confusion doctrines); supra Part III.A.1 (recognizing the complications created
when courts begin applying the quality factor to initial-interest and post-sale confusion
suits).
153
See supra Part II.B.2 (recognizing the difficulty courts face in determining what should
be considered under the quality factor in trademark infringement cases); supra Part III.A.3
(noting the contention developing among judiciary in deciding which attributes should be
considered under the quality factor in trademark infringement cases).
154
See supra Part III.A.2 (recognizing the difficulty in deciding what type of consumer
should be considered a reasonably prudent consumer). Ensuring that the quality of
defendant’s goods is not considered in initial-interest and post-sale confusion cases will
eliminate the problems created by such application. See supra text accompanying note 152
(noting that the quality of defendant’s good’s should only be considered as a subpart of the
proximity factor in point-of-sale confusion trademark infringement suits). Furthermore,
the problems associated with applying the reasonably prudent consumer standard to the
tarnishment and quality-control theories are eliminated because the quality of defendant’s
goods will now be considered from a similarity perspective under the proximity factor. See
supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (recognizing the problems of applying the
reasonably prudent consumer standard to the tarnishment and quality-control theories and
recognizing that under the similarity theory, more prudent consumers are more likely to
notice the similarity and, therefore, be confused as to source).
149
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defendant’s goods will be considered from a similarity perspective under
the proximity factor of the likelihood of consumer confusion test, it
should also be considered from a tarnishment perspective when
choosing the proper relief in a trademark infringement suit.155
C. Incorporating the Quality of Defendant’s Goods into the Court’s Relief
Assessment
The quality of the alleged infringer’s goods should play an
important role in the court’s decision to issue different forms of relief.156
When determining the “quality” of defendant’s goods the court should
consider relevant elements about the nature of the good in addition to
the quality of the good itself.157 Furthermore, as part of the court’s
decision to grant judicial relief the court should apply the tarnishment
theory recognizing that a confusingly similar mark applied to a distinctly
lesser quality good may cause immediate irreparable harm to both the
senior user and the consumer.158 Specifically, the quality of defendant’s
goods can be a determining factor in issuing immediate injunctive
relief.159 By incorporating these changes, the benefits of initially
adopting the quality of defendant’s goods as a factor have been
maintained, while eliminating the detriments caused by making it a
separate factor in the likelihood of consumer confusion test in trademark
infringement suits.160
155
See infra Part IV.C (incorporating the quality of defendant’s goods into the courts
assessment of damages and relief in trademark infringement cases).
156
See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of including
quality of defendant’s goods in the court’s decision to issue damages and relief).
157
See supra Part II.B.2 (recognizing the difficulty courts face in determining what should
be considered under the quality factor in trademark infringement cases); supra Part III.A.3
(noting the contention developing among judiciary in deciding which attributes should be
considered under the quality factor in trademark infringement cases).
158
See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (recognizing that the tarnishment
theory has two benefits which include focusing on the potential current and future harm
developed by the alleged infringer and protecting the consumer from worry related to
purchasing a cheap knock-off or inferior product).
159
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (supporting a conclusion that the quality of
defendant’s goods may be justification for immediate injunctive relief because of the
destructive nature a distinctly inferior good plays on a senior user’s image and goodwill).
160
Adding the quality of defendant’s goods under a tarnishment perspective to the
court’s damages and relief assessment maintains the benefits of focusing on the current and
future harm caused to the senior user and the consumer from a distinctly inferior good. See
supra note 158 and accompanying text (recognizing the two benefits of the tarnishment
theory). Furthermore, the detriments relating to the tarnishment theory were only
applicable when the theory was being applied under the likelihood of consumer confusion
test and are therefore eliminated. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text (outlining
the detriments relating to the tarnishment theory’s application to the likelihood of
consumer confusion test in trademark infringement cases). Additionally, adding the
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These three alterations, as outlined in Parts IV.A–C, do not affect the
current federal statutory law governing trademark infringement suits.161
The law’s clear intent that courts must determine the likelihood of
consumer confusion in trademark infringement suits caused the circuits
to adopt individual multifactor tests through common law.162 Therefore,
the changes will only affect the current state of each circuit’s trademark
infringement common law and slightly alter the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition which, if adopted by the jurisdiction, protects
unregistered marks.163
D. Amending the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §21(b),
Comment g, & Comment k to Reflect the Three Common Law Alterations
The proposed changes to the Restatement occur in section twentyone.164 Section twenty-one includes suggested likelihood of confusion
factors and subpart (b) references what is commonly known as the
proximity factor.165 The following text is an excerpt of section twentyquality of defendant’s goods to the proximity factor from a similarity perspective maintains
the benefits of recognizing a likelihood of confusion from similar quality goods and
recognizing that distinctly different quality goods are less likely to confuse consumers. See
supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (noting the two advantages the similarity theory
has when applied to the quality of defendants goods in trademark infringement cases).
Moreover, both of the similarity theory detriments have been eliminated. See supra notes
123–24 and accompanying text (explaining that the similarity theory is inconsequential
when the tarnishment theory is applied or when the court considers it under both the
proximity factor and the individual quality of defendant’s goods factor). Finally, the only
benefit gained from applying the quality-control theory did not actually relate to consumer
confusion and therefore is no longer relevant to the likelihood of consumer confusion test.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (suggesting that the quality-control theory can
provide protection to those senior users suing alleged infringers with higher quality
goods). Concurrently, the disadvantageous nature of implementing a per se rule of
invalidity as recognized by the quality-control theory has been eliminated from the current
application of the quality of defendant’s goods in trademark infringement suits. See supra
note 130 and accompanying text (identifying the quality control theory as an almost per se
rule of invalidity).
161
See supra note 22 and accompanying text (outlining the relevant federal trademark
infringement laws).
162
See supra note 22 (recognizing that both sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act
require likelihood of consumer confusion for a trademark infringement finding); supra note
28 and accompanying text (outlining each circuit’s multifactor likelihood of consumer
confusion test).
163
See supra note 22 (outlining the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20
(1995), which is used to protect unregistered trademarks from infringement). See also infra
Part IV.D (amending the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION).
164
See infra text accompanying notes 167–68 (amending two comments of RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21).
165
See infra note 166 and accompanying text (outlining RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 21(b)).
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one of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition with proposed
language adding the discussed changes in italics and proposed deletions
struck-out:
(b) the degree of similarity in the marketing methods and channels
of distribution used for the respective goods or services166
[Comment] g. Marketing methods. The likelihood that
confusion will result from the concurrent use of similar
designations may depend on the marketing methods
and channels of distribution used by the respective
sellers. If similar marks are used on goods sold through
the same marketing channels, the probability of
confusion may be higher than if the goods are marketed
through separate channels. Thus, similar marks used on
goods sold through single-brand distributors may be
less confusing than when used on goods sold through
multi-brand outlets, and goods sold only at discount
outlets might not be confused with goods sold only in
specialty shops. Therefore, a court may consider whether the
defendant’s goods alone are of similar quality in a point-of-sale
confusion suit to assist in determining if the goods are likely
to be sold to the same reasonably prudent consumer.
If similar marks are used on goods or services that
are marketed to the same prospective purchasers, the
likelihood of confusion is greater than if there are few
common purchasers. Use of a mark in advertisements
appearing only in trade journals directed at professional
buyers, for example, may be unlikely to cause confusion
with a similar mark used in advertising directed to the
general public. Men’s suits and are men's ties bearing
similar marks are more likely to be associated with a
common source than are men’s suits and women's
shoes, in part because the latter kinds of goods are
normally sold in different stores or departments and are
purchased by different consumers.167

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21(b).
The proposed changes are the contribution of the author. The added portion in italics
and deleted portion struck-through modify RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 21(b), cmt. g.

166
167
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[Comment] kh. Quality of defendant’s the actor's goods
or services. The quality of defendant’s the actor's goods
or services may be relevant in assessing the likelihood of
consumer confusion.
For purposes of determining
whether confusion is likely, the relevant factor is the
extent of the similarity difference in quality between the
goods or services of the subsequent user and those of the
trademark owner. Markedly similar different quality
goods may suggest that the goods are sold to similar
different purchasers or in similar different market
channels, or that the products are unlikely to be
associated with a common source. On the other hand, if
the subsequent user's goods are inferior to those of the
prior user and confusion does occur, the threat to the
reputation of the prior user is particularly acute.
Although courts sometimes require less evidence of
confusion when the subsequent use is on inferior goods,
[E]vidence of inferior quality is more properly relevant
to may be used by courts in fashioning appropriate relief if
a likelihood of confusion is otherwise established.168
Commentary
The following discussion is a commentary to the proposed changes
to section twenty-one of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition.169 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition does not
delineate each consideration when analyzing the proximity factor of the
likelihood of consumer confusion test in an unregistered trademark
infringement suit.170 Therefore, the changes made to section twenty-one
had to be incorporated into the comment section in order to ensure that
the quality of defendant’s goods is only used as one subpart to the
overall proximity factor.171 Furthermore, the new addition includes the
limitation of only applying the subpart in point-of-sale confusion suits
and only considering the actual quality of defendant’s goods through the
The proposed changes are the contribution of the author. The added portion in italics
and deleted portion struck-through modify RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 21(b), cmt. k.
169
See infra notes 170–75 and accompanying text (commenting on the amendments to
comment g and comment k in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION).
170
See supra text accompanying note 166 (recognizing that subpart (b), also known as the
proximity factor, does not include a discussion of what attributes should be considered in
determining the similarity or proximity of the goods).
171
See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text (amending RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmts. g, k).
168
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perspective of a reasonably prudent consumer.172 The previously titled
“quality of the actor’s goods or services” comment was relocated to
ensure consistent application within the proximity factor.173 The
restatement section already described the similarity doctrine but needed
minor alterations to maintain consistency and ensure that the reader
would realize that the tarnishment theory was no longer applicable at
this point in the analysis.174 Finally, the last line was altered to express
the appropriate method for applying the quality of defendant’s goods in
the determination of appropriate relief.175 These alterations will help
courts understand the proposed common law alterations and prevent the
disarray among judiciary as illustrated by the Bale University
hypothetical.176
E. Applying the Common Law Alterations to the Bale University Hypothetical
The Bale University hypothetical recognized the problems created by
the current disarray among and within circuit courts.177 Furthermore, it
recognized the degree of injustice created by the split among circuit
courts in determining the proper application of quality of defendant’s
goods in trademark infringement cases.178 This Part recognizes that
justice can be served by applying the proposed common law alterations
to the Bale University hypothetical.179
Applying the first common law alteration, which removes the
quality of defendant’s goods as an individual factor, immediately
eliminates the discrepancies created by each circuit court’s application of
different methods for using the quality factor in the separate trademark

See supra note 167 and accompanying text (adding a sentence to the end of the first
paragraph which recognizes that the reasonably prudent consumer may only apply the
actual quality of defendant’s goods to the proximity factor in point-of-sale confusion cases).
173
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (altering comment k’s location by placing it
under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21(b) as comment h).
174
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (changing the focus of the new comment h
from a difference perspective to a similarity perspective).
175
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (adding a final line to the new comment h
that recognizes a courts ability to use the quality of defendant’s goods in determining a
proper remedy).
176
See infra Part IV.E (reanalyzing the introductory hypothetical under the proposed
common law alterations).
177
See supra Part I (noting that a single plaintiff can encounter four different methods of
applying the quality of defendant’s goods to trademark infringement cases).
178
See supra Part I (recognizing that an argued legal theory may be successful in one
circuit and may be dismissed in another, even if the plaintiff has mandatory case law
showing higher courts’ adoption of the legal theory).
179
See infra text accompanying notes 180–82 (applying each of the proposed alterations to
the common law to create justice in a previously unjust hypothetical).
172
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infringement suits.180 Furthermore, the second common law alteration,
incorporating the similarity theory in the proximity factor, ensures that
Bale University can argue that consumers are more likely to be confused
by marks placed on similar quality services because similar quality
services are offered to similar consumers.181 Finally, the third alteration
to the common law, incorporating the tarnishment theory into the
remedy decision making process, allows Bale University to receive
preliminary injunctive relief in cases where the alleged infringer’s mark,
if confused with the “Bale University” trademark, is likely to cause
destructive damage to the Bale University image.182 Therefore, applying
the proposed common law alterations will remove the injustices created
by the current federal court disarray.183
V. CONCLUSION
The current methods for applying the quality of defendant’s goods
to trademark infringement suits are inadequate. Currently, courts have
the discretion to apply any of the three mutually exclusive theories on an
erroneous ad hoc basis. The tarnishment, similarity, and quality-control
theories each have weaknesses when applied to the individual factor
known as quality of defendant’s goods. However, eliminating the
individual factor while still applying the similarity and tarnishment
theories in new ways will create order among the circuits regarding the
proper application of the quality of defendant’s goods to trademark
infringement cases.
The best solution for applying the quality factor to trademark
infringement suits is to eliminate it as a separate factor, incorporate the
factor with certain express limitations as a subpart of the proximity
factor through the similarity theory, and include the factor in the court’s
determination of damages and relief through the tarnishment theory.
Courts must know that the quality of defendant’s goods matters only
under the proximity factor with the following limitations: it may only be
applied to point-of-sale confusion cases, quality only relates to the goods
themselves, and quality is determined by the reasonably prudent

See supra Part IV.A (explaining the reasons for removing the quality of defendant’s
goods as an individual factor).
181
See supra Part IV.B (supporting the addition of quality of defendant’s goods to the
proximity factor).
182
See supra Part IV.C (recognizing the benefit of applying the quality of defendant’s
goods to the court’s remedy decision making process).
183
See supra Part IV (detailing the benefits of adopting the proposed alterations,
including the elimination of the erroneous application of three mutually exclusive legal
theories to the quality of defendant’s goods in trademark infringement cases).
180
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consumer. Uniformly adopting these alterations to the common law of
trademark infringement will remove the current status of disarray
among judiciary and prevent the injustice recognized by the Bale
University hypothetical. Quality does matter in limited circumstances.
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